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The profound institutional and structural differences between Japa-
nese and North American labor markets are well known.  Despite these
differences, the two types of economies face a common problem: find-
ing the best way to reallocate labor when technological, trade, and
other shocks raise the demand for workers in some activities but reduce
the demand in others.  When these shocks occur, can permanent dis-
placement, especially of vulnerable senior workers, be avoided?  If not,
what are the consequences of such displacements? 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a detailed description of
the incidence and consequences of worker displacement in a North
American economy—Canada—and in Japan.  We begin with a brief
description of the main modes of labor adjustment in the two countries,
situating worker displacement in the broader context of how firms
adjust to declines in product demand.  Next we describe the legal and
social institutions most likely to affect the displacement process and
the general labor market conditions prevailing in each country at the
time of our analysis.  We then analyze, in turn, the frequency of dis-
placement in each country and its consequences. 
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Our main findings are as follows.  First, the primary mechanisms
by which Japanese and Canadian firms shed workers differ.  In Japan
involuntary terminations can take three main forms: layoffs, mandatory
retirement, and a kind of outplacement called shukko.  In addition to
simply laying workers off, Japanese firms often terminate workers as
young as their mid 40s by forcing them to take a retirement package.
Shukko involves placing workers at affiliated or related firms.  Some-
times used as a means of transferring skills across company lines, it is
also used, especially for older workers, simply as a means of reducing
the workforce.  While some younger shukko workers may be recalled
to their original employer, this is seldom the case for older workers. 
In Canada neither shukko nor mandatory retirement (at least for
prime-age workers) is a common method of adjusting to demand
shocks.  Layoffs, which are common, take a different form there
because their permanence is often unclear.  Over half of all laid-off
workers in Canada expect at the time of layoff to return to their original
employer, and over 40 percent actually do so.  Furthermore, neither
workers nor firms are good predictors of actual recall probabilities.
Thus the process of displacement in Canada, rather than being a sharp
and permanent break, more typically begins with a layoff of no clear
permanence and proceeds through an updating of probabilities of recall
to the original workplace.
Second, perhaps surprisingly, institutional factors affecting dis-
placed workers in Japan and Canada have as many similarities as dif-
ferences.  Both Japanese and Canadian firms, for example, are required
to provide advance notice to workers being laid off, with statutory
notice requirements actually somewhat higher in Canada.  At the same
time, however, Canadian firms can lay workers off for “economic” rea-
sons without having to justify their actions legally; in Japan such lay-
offs must be justified, and certain procedural requirements satisfied,
before they occur.  Employment insurance benefits in both countries
have similar replacement rates and are limited to less than a year in
duration.  Japan has a much more explicit and comprehensive program
of adjustment subsidies for declining industries than Canada, but a
number of such programs exist on an ad hoc basis in Canada as well. 
Wage-setting institutions, such as unions and minimum wages, can
be relevant to displaced workers by affecting the distribution of pre-
and postdisplacement wages.  In both countries only a minority of
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workers are unionized.  In both countries, wage bargaining is at the
enterprise level, although Japan has an element of coordination
(shunto) not present in Canada.  In both countries, statutory minimum
wages are set at subnational (province or prefecture) levels and are
only a small fraction of average wages, compared to many European
countries.  Unlike Canada, however, Japan has a system of industry-
specific minimum wages which may provide a channel whereby col-
lectively bargained wages can have some impact on the wages of unor-
ganized workers. 
Third, separations are much more frequent in the Canadian than
the Japanese labor market, especially for men: in firms with at least
five workers, and in jobs that have lasted at least a month, there are
0.36 separations per employed male in Canada per year; in Japan there
are one-third as many, 0.12.   A very large share of this difference,
however, is due to the large number of temporary layoffs in Canada;
when we look only at (ex post) permanent separations, overall separa-
tion rates are similar in the two countries.  They are in fact higher
among Japanese women than among Canadian women.
Fourth, a much larger share of separations is labeled as involuntary
(in other words, firm-initiated) in Canada than in Japan.  In Canada,
about two-thirds of separating workers say they were “laid off”; this
agrees roughly with the fraction of separations that firms label as due
to “shortage of work.” In Japan, under 10 percent of separations are
labeled (by firms) as due to “management convenience” (which
includes shukko workers).  In fact, the total of all “involuntary” separa-
tions in Japan (which also includes mandatory retirements and the
expiration of fixed-term contracts) is under one-third of all separations. 
Fifth, the combination of similar permanent separation rates plus a
larger involuntary share in Canada means that worker displacement—
permanent, involuntary separation—is more common in Canada than
Japan.  The difference is very large if we focus only on men and on a
narrow definition of displacement (“management convenience” only)
in Japan: a displacement rate of 6.1 percent per year in Canada versus
1.3 percent in Japan.  Smaller, but still substantial, differences exist for
women and for broader definitions of displacement in Japan. 
Sixth, we find a fascinating pattern (at least to a non-Japanese
audience) in the age pattern of permanent layoffs in Japan and Canada.
In Canada, as one might expect, layoff rates decline with age, as work-
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ers settle into jobs and accumulate seniority (which in North America
tends to protect workers from a layoff).  In Japan, young workers have
very low layoff rates, but these layoff rates increase with age.  This
system of seniority-based (rather than inverse-seniority-based) layoffs
in Japan appears to place a larger share of the employment adjustment
burden on older, rather than younger, workers. 
Seventh, despite frequent comments about the inability of Japanese
labor markets to accommodate displaced mid-career workers, we find
that unemployment durations of displaced Japanese workers are much
shorter than those of displaced Canadian workers.  Focusing on Japa-
nese workers who separated due to a layoff, bankruptcy, declining
business, expiration of a casual or fixed-term contract, or mandatory
retirement, we find that median non-employment durations in the mid
1990s were under two months in Japan compared to just under six
months for Canadian men and over eight months for Canadian women.
The Japanese numbers would be even lower if we included the direct
job-to-job transitions among shukko workers in our calculations.  To
some extent, these low relative durations reflect the lower overall Japa-
nese unemployment rate even during the recessionary period of our
data.  However, they could also reflect low search intensities among
Canadian workers hoping to be recalled to their former employer.
Eighth, for all workers under the age of about 50 in both countries,
the mean wage consequence of displacement is essentially zero.
Despite this, Canadian displaced workers are much more likely to
experience large wage declines than Japanese displaced workers: all
told, 14.5 percent of displaced Canadian men (16.4 percent of women)
experience wage declines of more than 30 percent, compared with 8.7
and 4.3 percent respectively in Japan (the Japanese numbers are even
smaller if we include shukko workers in the sample).  These two facts
are reconciled by the greater likelihood of large displacement-related
wage increases in Canada: fully 17 percent of displaced Canadian men
experience a wage gain of over 30 percent, compared with under 2 per-
cent of displaced Japanese men; comparable numbers for women are
18 and 3 percent.  These wage consequences of displacement may
reflect a more compressed wage structure in Japan than Canada.  Japa-
nese displaced workers thus appear to face much less wage uncertainty
than Canadian displaced workers. 
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Ninth, the mean wage loss associated with displacement increases
with age in both countries, especially in Japan.  In a sample of Japanese
men over age 55 whose separation is due to management convenience,
mandatory retirement, or contract expiration, mean wage losses are
substantial (10 to 15 percent).  It is unclear how much of this reflects
mandatory “retirement” followed by lower-wage work, or simple lay-
offs (or, for that matter, whether this distinction is very meaningful).
This age pattern in wage losses reinforces the notion that older workers
bear a larger share of the adjustment burden in Japan than in Canada,
which emerges from our examination of layoff rates.
Finally, we compute a simple summary measure of the combined
employment and wage security experienced by Japanese and Canadian
workers.  Aside from combining the above information on the inci-
dence and consequences of displacement, this measure has the advan-
tage of not being affected by possible differences in the labeling of
separations between countries.  In particular, the measure we compute
is the fraction of employed persons who, in a given year, are likely to
experience a wage loss of 30 percent or more as a result of an employer
change.  This fraction is 1.9 percent for Canadian men versus 0.8 per-
cent for Japanese men.  This gap becomes much larger if we exclude
older Japanese men: for example, for men aged 35–39, the rates are 1.7
percent in Canada versus only 0.2 percent in Japan.  “Prime-age” Japa-
nese men thus experience a level of wage and job security that may be
unrivalled anywhere.  This international gap in total earnings security
is smaller for women and is dramatically reversed for older men: con-
ditional on continuing to work, 6.8 percent of employed Japanese men
over the age of 60 experience a separation resulting in a wage drop of
more than 30 percent each year, compared to only 1.0 percent of Cana-
dian men. 
All told, despite a worsening Japanese recession and historically
very high unemployment rates, our findings clearly show that—with
one exception—Japanese workers are less likely to be displaced, expe-
rience less unemployment when displaced, and are less likely to suffer
a large wage reduction as a consequence of displacement.  That one
exception is for men over the age of about 55 and reflects, at least in
part, the common Japanese practice of mandatory retirement followed
by work at lower wages in a more casual labor market.  With that one
potential exception, we do not find evidence that—at least compared to
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Canada—Japanese labor markets are poorly adapted to the task of
reemploying displaced mid-career workers. 
EMPLOYMENT ADJUSTMENT MECHANISMS
Firms can adjust to declines in the demand for their products in a
number of ways, many of which do not involve involuntary reductions
in employment.  These mechanisms include the development of new
products, reductions in employee compensation, reductions in hours
per worker, reductions in hiring, and voluntary workforce attrition.
The mix of these mechanisms chosen by firms is known to vary sub-
stantially among countries.  Nakamura and Nakamura (1991) showed,
for example, that Japanese firms tend to adjust hours of work and
wages, while U.S. firms tend to adjust employment.  Despite this and
other alternative forms of flexibility, involuntary employment reduc-
tions must sometimes occur in Japan, especially in the recent recession.
The incidence and consequences of these reductions have, to date, been
very little studied and are our main interests in this chapter.  The
remainder of this section describes the primary mechanisms by which
involuntary workforce reductions occur in the two countries.  As most
readers will be less familiar with the Japanese case, our focus will be
mainly on that country.  
Japan
Mandatory retirement
As is well known, mandatory retirement at a prearranged age is a
common feature of the Japanese labor market.  Also, much more fre-
quently than in Canada or the United States, it is followed by employ-
ment at a different firm, often on a part-time basis and usually at a
lower wage.1  The mandatory retirement age recommended by the gov-
ernment is 60 years; until very recently, however, many firms used 55
as the retirement age for many of their workers.2  Mandatory retirement
at age 55 is sufficiently common in Japan to be reflected in aggregate
wage statistics.  For example, Figure 3.1 shows cross-section age-wage
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profiles for regular Japanese workers in 1993.  These profiles grow
monotonically to age 54 but drop suddenly at age 55.
A less well-known feature of the Japanese labor market is the com-
mon use of mandatory retirement well in advance of the pre-arranged
age as a means of labor adjustment.  This can occur as early as a
worker’s early 40s.  It is also known that so-called voluntary early-
retirement programs are not always voluntary and that some targeted
workers feel pressure to accept such packages.  Early-retirement
schemes are very common in large Japanese firms: almost half of firms
with more than 5,000 employees had such programs in 1990, compared
with under 2 percent of firms with 30–99 employees (Japan Ministry of
Labor 1992). 
Many Japanese firms provide workers with a lump-sum payment
on retirement.  The amount of such retirement pay depends on the
number of years of service and the rank the worker has attained in the
firm at the time of retirement; it can range from one year’s to several
years’ salary.  These retirement payments are separate from annual
pensions and receive distinct, favorable tax treatment.  Seike (1993)
Figure 3.1 Wage Profiles by Age and Education, Japan
SOURCE: Japan Ministry of Labor.
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showed that the marginal gain workers get from their retirement lump-
sum payments by staying with their present employer for another year
is positive for younger age groups but negative for those above age 40.
He concluded that for older age groups the presence of lump-sum
retirement pay encourages workers’ separations from their employers.
A sweetened lump-sum retirement pay is often used as a bargaining
tool for soliciting early retirements from middle-aged workers.  One
difference between severance pay in Canada and the lump-sum retire-
ment pay in Japan is that the latter is paid even if workers quit prior to
their normal mandatory retirement ages.
Shukko
A second form of involuntary separation in Japan occurs when
firms simply assign their workers to an affiliate or otherwise-related
firm; this arrangement is known as shukko.  Most shukko assignments
occur within vertically or horizontally related groups of firms
(keiretsu) in Japan.3  These new jobs are often with smaller firms and
pay less than the workers’ current jobs.  There are two types of shukko,
the first of which (tenseki) represents a one-way ticket to another firm
with virtually no possibility of coming back to the original employer.
The second type, ichiji (temporary) shukko, involves a substantial
probability of returning to the original employer after a few years.  It is
more prevalent for younger workers.  For example, younger workers
may be assigned to some jobs at other firms as part of their job rotation
for learning certain skills required by the original employer.  More-
experienced workers of a parent firm may also go on temporary shukko
to its affiliated firms in order to teach some skill the parent firm wants
the affiliated firms to possess.  Many firms have agreements with their
labor unions regarding the practice of calling back workers on tempo-
rary shukko within three or four years after their shukko assignments
start.
For both temporary and permanent shukko, the original employer
often pays most (or all) of the wages of the workers who are sent out, at
least for the first year or two.  After that, the new employer may start
paying shukko workers’ salaries, depending on the arrangement made
between the two employers. At that point in time these workers may
become regular employees of the new company and sever their ties to
the old. 
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An example of the use of shukko in a Japanese firm is given in Fig-
ure 3.2, which shows the age distribution of employees at a large Japa-
nese steel producer in 1997.  About 4.5 percent of the firm’s employees
are 49 (34 + 15) years of age.  Of those, fewer than two-thirds (under 3
percent) are actually working at the company, while the remainder are
away on shukko assignments (on loan) to other employers.  Those on
shukko assignments may or may not be on the firm’s payroll.  The pro-
portion of employees on shukko starts to increase rapidly beginning at
about age 44 (15 + 29) and exceeds 50 percent of the total workforce
by age 51.  Most of the shukko employees older than their mid 40s will
not come back to their original employer, while those in their 20s and
30s are quite likely to do so. 
Because shukko workers, especially of the “permanent” type, expe-
rience involuntary employer changes, they can be thought of as a kind
of displaced worker.  In contrast to North American displaced workers,
however, they do not experience any unemployment.  As we shall see,
Figure 3.2 Shukko and Age Distribution of Workers at a Large Japanese 
Steel Company, 1977
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they also experience only very small wage changes, at least within one
year of moving to the new firm.
Layoffs and the process of employment reduction  
In Japan, there are also workers who lose jobs because employers
cannot afford to keep them on, or because their employers have gone
out of business.  Generally, layoffs are used as a last resort after other
mechanisms, like mandatory retirement and shukko, have been
exhausted.  As an illustration of this, Figure 3.3 shows how these pro-
cesses were sequenced as Japanese manufacturers were forced to
reduce employment from 1987 through early 1994.  Clearly, the post-
bubble recession had a major impact on employment adjustment, start-
Figure 3.3 Methods of Employment Adjustment at Manufacturing 
Establishments between 1987 (Q1) and 1994 (Q2)
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ing almost immediately after the bubble burst in 1990.  As the change
in the production index for manufacturing and mining registered a
sharp decline in late 1991, reductions in overtime immediately fol-
lowed.
These were joined by job rotations and shukko as well as reduc-
tions in, or complete termination of, new employment for mid-career
workers.  These methods, in turn, were followed by nonrenewal or can-
cellation of contracts with part-time employees.  Next, temporary
forced vacations of regular employees were implemented.  Finally,
after part-time workers were terminated, about 2 percent of Japanese
manufacturers also implemented voluntary early-retirement programs
and layoffs between 1992 and 1994 (see Higuchi 1996, for example).
Thus, layoffs are clearly a last resort; but they do occur.  They have
been studied very little in Japan, and we hope to make an early attempt
in this chapter at understanding their frequency and consequences.
Canada
Neither mandatory retirement for prime-age workers nor shukko is
an important feature of firms’ labor adjustment policies in Canada.
The dominant form of involuntary downward employment adjustment
used by Canadian firms is clearly layoff into unemployment.  At the
same time, however, it is important to realize that not all layoffs consti-
tute what we normally think of as displacements.  The main reason for
this is that a large fraction of layoffs in North America are temporary,
and the workers involved expect to return to the original employer after
a short time.  That a worker has been displaced, or permanently laid
off, from her or his employer, may thus not be immediately obvious (to
either the worker or the firm) at the time of separation.  The sets of dis-
placed and temporarily laid-off workers can be very fluid on the mar-
gin, and studies using ex post definitions will have quite different
samples than those using ex ante ones.
The distinction between permanent and temporary layoffs figures
prominently in the definition of displaced workers in Canada and has
potentially important consequences for search intensities and unem-
ployment durations.  We explore this distinction in depth later in this
chapter.  
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LEGISLATION AND INSTITUTIONS AFFECTING 
DISPLACED WORKERS
In this section we describe the main laws and institutions that are
likely to affect the frequency and consequences of worker displace-
ment in Japan and Canada.  We begin with a discussion of employ-
ment-protection legislation, namely policies which limit firms’
freedom to reduce employment, including mandatory advance-notice
periods, mandated severance pay, unjust dismissal laws, and require-
ments to consult with local governments before engaging in mass lay-
offs.4  We then discuss the “passive” income support (primarily
employment insurance) available to unemployed workers in both coun-
tries.  Next we focus on a set of policies that are particularly prevalent
in Japan but probably less common, and certainly more ad hoc, in Can-
ada: subsidies to employers and workers in “threatened” industries,
designed both to maintain employment in the old firms and to encour-
age mobility into new product lines and industries.  Finally, we briefly
describe the main institutions, apart from firms, that shape the wage-
setting process in both countries: collective bargaining and minimum
wages.  Because these institutions shape the distribution of wages
among individuals, jobs, firms, and industries, they can have a signifi-
cant effect on the wage changes experienced by displaced workers.
Our description of laws and other institutions in the two countries
below is quite detailed and is meant to function both as background to
the empirical work in this chapter and as reference material to
researchers interested in displacement and related policy.  Readers
already familiar with Japanese and Canadian labor market institutions,
or who are mostly interested in just what happens to displaced workers
in the two countries, might happily skip ahead to our section on Gen-
eral Economic Conditions (p. 220).
Employment Protection Legislation
Japan
Japanese employment law, like that of many European countries,
distinguishes between workers on “regular” employment contracts
(usually long-term and full-time) and those working under other
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arrangements, including temporary and part-time workers.  For work-
ers on regular contracts, substantial legal precedent requires firms to
demonstrate “just cause” to terminate their employment.  Workers
without regular contracts do not necessarily enjoy this just-cause pro-
tection, but they can qualify if they have worked for the same employer
for a long time.5  “Just cause” in Japan can include declines in business,
but if firms want to invoke this reason to lay workers off, they must be
able to demonstrate the following: 1) the necessity of the layoff, 2) that
they have made efforts to avoid layoffs, 3) appropriate procedure, and
4) rational and fair choice of those to be laid off.  Vol-untary early
retirement programs are a typical part of the “efforts to avoid layoffs.”
To first lay off nonregular workers, such as temporary and part-time
workers, is accepted as an “appropriate procedure.”  While negotiating
with the labor union is considered to be an integral part of the proce-
dure, employers can lay workers off even if no agreement with the
labor union is reached after the employer has made a sincere effort.  
The Japanese Labor Code requires that 30 days’ advance notice be
given to workers prior to a layoff; as in Canada firms have the option
of paying the equivalent amount of severance in lieu of giving notice.
Despite this low amount of statutory notice, it seems likely that, given
the substantial procedural requirements that must be fulfilled to dem-
onstrate the justification of layoffs in Japan, “effective” notice—the
amount of time before the layoff when workers actually know it is
coming—may in fact be substantially greater in duration.
Canada
In Canada, two main bodies of legislation restrict firms’ abilities to
terminate workers’ employment.6  The first and older of these is the
common law, which governs the interpretation and enforcement of pri-
vate employment contracts.  According to Canadian common law,
labor contracts without an explicit fixed duration can be terminated by
the firm in two main ways: termination for cause or by giving notice.
Permissible “causes” are defined by centuries of British and Canadian
case law and include items such as repeated insolence, drunkenness, or
morally improper behavior (Arthurs et al., 1993, pp. 153–155).
In contrast to dismissal for cause, termination of employment for
“economic” reasons, such as a shortage of work, generally requires
giving the employee a “reasonable” amount of notice under Canadian
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common law.  In the event of a dispute, what is reasonable is deter-
mined by a judge, who is expected to consider the custom in the indus-
try and geographical area, the periodicity of payment (hourly, weekly,
or monthly, and so forth), and the difficulty the employee will have in
finding a new job (Arthurs et al., 1993, pp. 146–149).  As enforcing
these common law provisions for reasonable notice generally requires
workers to bring a civil suit against their employer, this option is typi-
cally exercised only by highly paid workers.  It is worth noting, how-
ever, that in such situations the courts have determined advance-notice
requirements of as much as 21 months to be “reasonable.”7
The second main body of law regulating layoffs in Canada is con-
tained in the Employment Standards Acts of its 13 labor jurisdictions.8
These acts set minimum conditions that must be satisfied by all
employment relationships, including minimum wages, paid vacations,
and limits on overtime work.  Of these, three main provisions would
likely be considered “employment-protection laws”: advance notice of
layoff, severance pay, and consultation requirements.  
Minimum mandatory notice statutes for permanent layoffs in each
of the Canadian labor jurisdictions are summarized in Table 3.1, which
shows the state of legislation as of September 1, 1997.9  In most cases,
mandated notice depends on the duration of employment, ranging from
1 week for relatively new workers to 8 weeks for workers with 10 or
more years of experience.  Generally, as in Japan, an employee can be
given pay in lieu of notice.10  Separate regulations exist for mass termi-
nation in 11 of the 13 jurisdictions.  The number of workers necessary
to constitute a mass termination is usually 50 or more in a period of
four weeks.  The amount of notice that must be given ranges from 4
weeks to 18 weeks, depending on the number of workers let go. 
Employment-protection legislation in two Canadian jurisdictions
also includes severance pay.  In the federal jurisdiction, the amount of
compensation is not large, consisting of two days’ wages to be paid per
year of service.  In Ontario, severance packages apply only to employ-
ees with five or more years of service; the amount of compensation
given is quite high, however, at one week of severance pay for each
year of service, to a maximum of 26 weeks.  Finally, most Canadian
jurisdictions with mass-termination laws compel employers, in the
event of a mass layoff, to establish and finance a “manpower adjust-
ment committee” with worker representation to develop an adjustment
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program for workers and to help workers in finding new employment
opportunities.  Furthermore, the firms must advise and cooperate with
local governments regarding the closure procedure.
Unlike the common law, employee remedies for employer non-
compliance with minimum notice statutes are relatively fast and cost-
less.  In Ontario, for example, an employee has only to notify the local
Employment Standards office and this can be done by telephone.  The
claim is then investigated and if the employer is found liable, he or she
may be ordered by a judge to reimburse wages for the required notice
period.
Given their universal application and ease of enforcement, one
would expect the statutory notice provisions outlined above to be rele-
vant to a much larger number of workers than those in the common
law.  While this is certainly true, Table 3.2 shows that even these mini-
mum standards do not result in notice actually being received by the
majority of workers experiencing a permanent layoff in Canada: only
35 percent of men and about 44 percent of women in such situations
report receiving any formal notice at all.  Of those who receive formal
notice, about 30 percent obtain less than one week; only 6–10 percent
(or 2–7 percent of all layoffs) receive more than one month (four
weeks) of notice.  The fraction expecting the permanent layoff is some-
what higher, at 63 and 60 percent for men and women, respectively,
but even among these the vast majority learned of the impending job
loss less than two weeks in advance.  The principal reason for this lack
of widespread notice is simply the preponderance of very short jobs in
any sample of Canadian job losers.  Thus, notice requirements are not
binding on employers for the majority of job losers in Canada.  It
would be very useful to know how much “effective” notice of this kind
is actually available to displaced workers in Japan, but we are not
aware of any source of such information. 
Finally, it is interesting to note that the current mix of employ-
ment-protection laws in Canada has resulted from a series of province-
by-province increases in legislated notice starting in the 1960s.
Indeed, despite the recent move to the political right in a number of
jurisdictions, and despite significant retrenchment in a number of
social programs and in labor relations legislation, as of January 1999
there has not been a single instance of a reduction in employment-pro-
tection law in Canada.  In contrast to Europe, where employment-pro-
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tection laws have been blamed for high unemployment rates and in
many cases have been scaled back as a result, current levels of Cana-
dian employment-protection legislation have not been perceived as a
major obstacle to business.  Instead, it appears that they are sufficiently
valued by middle-class voters in a time of greater perceived job insecu-
rity to make any attack on them politically unprofitable.
Comparing Canadian and Japanese employment-protection laws, it
seems that, if anything, minimum statutory provisions for notice and
severance are stronger in Canada.  At the same time, however, it is not
clear that these statutory provisions apply to most laid-off workers in
Canada, and it may be the case that the stricter procedural requirements
for layoffs in Japan give rise to greater “effective” notice than the stat-
utory minimum in most cases.  Ranking the two countries in terms of
legal impediments to layoffs is therefore not clear; to this end, statistics
on how far in advance Japanese workers actually knew of their layoff
would be very useful in future research.
Passive Income Support
Japan
Japan’s employment insurance (EI) system covers all employed
workers except those aged 60 or older, government employees, and
ship workers.  Eligibility conditions include employment in EI-covered
jobs for at least six months in the year prior to job separation and appli-
cation to a government placement office for job-seeking status.  Some
restrictions apply for voluntary quits. 
Statutory benefit levels under Japan’s employment insurance sys-
tem are presented in Table 3.3.  EI payments range between 60 and 80
percent (50 and 80 percent for those 60 to 64) of the regular wage on
the last job held, up to a maximum.  The replacement rate declines with
the rate of pay on the last job, while the maximum daily payment
increases with age up to 59.  Benefit duration varies from 90 to 300
days and is an increasing function of age, number of years insured, and
full-time status.  As the table indicates, somewhat longer benefits are
available for disabled and other “hard to employ” workers.11
In addition to basic income support, Japanese EI provides numer-
ous other allowances for items like learning a skill, lodging cost for job
training, disability during unemployment, job search, preparation for a
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new job, and moving costs.  There are also a number of programs for
unemployed workers who are not eligible under the EI law, such as a
training subsidy for changing jobs (Shokugyo tenkan kyuuhukin).
Finally, in addition to EI, Japan also has a welfare system for its long-
term unemployed.  Households certified for welfare receive cash and
in-kind payments in various forms.
Canada
In contrast to Japan’s EI system, which in most cases requires at
least half a year of work to qualify, Canada’s EI system allows workers
with quite short employment spells to qualify for benefits, especially in
high-unemployment regions. 
Canada’s system of passive income support for the unemployed
has two components: EI (called unemployment insurance [UI] before
1996), and Social Assistance, more commonly referred to as “welfare.”
EI, or UI, is federally operated, compulsory, and covers well over 90
percent of employed Canadians.  During the 1990s, the program went
through a series of substantial changes, primarily designed to reduce
costs.  In what follows we describe the main features of Canada’s UI
system in the period in which most of our data were collected—the mid
1990s.  Information about subsequent reforms to the system, in particu-
lar in 1996, is available in Canada Employment Insurance Commission
(1997).12
Despite the changes between 1990 and 1996, the main features of
UI were reasonably constant over this period since most of the amend-
ments were to parameters of the system rather than to the structure of
the program itself. Insurable employment was deemed to be any paid
employment over 15 hours per week, but earnings over a specified ceil-
ing were not insurable.  Premiums were (nominally) paid by both
workers and employers, but collected and remitted by employers.  In
addition to sufficient earnings, qualifying for benefits required a mini-
mum number of weeks of work during a 52-week qualifying period.
The number of work weeks required varied across regions, from 20 in
regions with a 6 percent or lower unemployment rate to 12 (10 in the
early part of the period) where the unemployment rate was above 13
percent.13
All claimants received the same statutory replacement rate for
earnings up to a weekly maximum.  In 1995 this was 55 percent (60
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percent for low-income individuals with a dependent) of the average
weekly insurable earnings for the 20 weeks prior to the claim.  The
number of benefit weeks to which one was entitled varied from 14 to
50 as a function of the local unemployment rate and the number of
qualifying weeks worked.  In January 1995, after several cuts to the
program’s generosity, in a high unemployment-rate region 12 weeks of
work entitled a worker to 32 weeks of benefits, while in a low unem-
ployment-rate region 12 weeks was too few to obtain benefits, and the
minimum number of weeks of work required for entitlement, 20, enti-
tled a worker to 14 weeks of benefits.  Workers with a full year of
employment still qualified for a full year of benefits.
The broad magnitudes of Canadian UI entitlements are thus
roughly comparable to those in Japan, summarized earlier.  There seem
to be two main differences, one of which is the greater generosity of
the Canadian system to part-year, or seasonal, workers, who at the very
most would be entitled to a lump sum of 50 days’ worth of benefits in
Japan.  On the other hand, the Japanese system offers higher replace-
ment rates, of up to 80 percent for low-wage workers, to displaced
workers with steady work histories.14
In addition to employment insurance, all Canadians, including sin-
gle men, are eligible for welfare (or in the case of those over age 65,
other social benefits).  Welfare is a provincial responsibility, and in
some provinces it is administered at a municipal level; thus there is
substantial inter- (and intra-) provincial heterogeneity.  Welfare can be
obtained after UI benefits are exhausted, and there is some evidence
that the two programs substitute for one another.  Like Japanese wel-
fare, (but unlike the current U.S. welfare system), Canadian welfare
has no benefit expiration.
Employment Maintenance and Adjustment Subsidies
Japan
Compared to the United States or Canada, Japan has a large num-
ber of programs specifically targeted at maintaining employment in
designated declining industries.  The Japanese programs are adminis-
tered under two distinct bodies of legislation: EI laws and employment
maintenance (EM) laws (koyo taisakuho).  Programs under both sys-
tems consist largely of employment, outplacement, and training subsi-
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dies; in this section we describe the programs administered under the
EI law only.15
Eligibility for most types of employment maintenance and adjust-
ment subsidies requires the firm or worker to be in one of two lists of
narrowly defined industries specified by the Ministry of Labor.  Indus-
tries in both these lists are typically in need of significant downward
employment adjustment.  Industries in the first list, “special employ-
ment adjustment industries” (tokutei koyo chosei gyoshu), are consid-
ered to face little prospect for future recovery; this is not necessarily
true of the second group, “employment adjustment subsidy industries”
(koyo chosei joseikin shitei gyoshu).  As of early 1998, there were 72
special employment adjustment industries comprising 86,954 estab-
lishments and 723,022 workers.  As of mid 1998, there were 51
employment adjustment subsidy industries, comprising 511,921 estab-
lishments and 846,957 workers.  Lists of both types of industries are
provided in the appendix.  Note that the average establishment covered
by both laws is very small, with only 8.3 and 1.6 employees, respec-
tively. 
Employment maintenance and adjustment subsidies paid under
Japan’s EI program fall into four main categories, discussed in turn
below.  The first of these is available to workers and firms in both
groups of industries described above.  The other three are available
only in special employment adjustment industries, those with little
prospect for recovery.   
Employment adjustment subsidy (koyo chosei joseikin).  This
law allows the Japanese government to subsidize the wages of workers
who are laid off, are on educational or training assignments because of
the lack of work, or are reassigned to another firm (shukko).  Current
subsidy rates are one-half of the wages of workers who are laid off or
on shukko, with a higher rate of two-thirds in small and medium-size
enterprises (SMEs).16  The maximum subsidy duration is 200 days for
laid-off workers and two years for shukko assignments.  This program
also pays half the cost of worker retraining or education (two-thirds in
SMEs) for up to two years.
Labor movement employment-stability subsidy (rodo ido koyo
antei joseikin).  This subsidy is given to those firms in special employ-
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ment-adjustment industries which invested in new lines of business in
order to employ workers who have become redundant in the old opera-
tions.  Interestingly, these subsidies are also payable to firms in any
industry who hire workers displaced from special employment-adjust-
ment industries.  The subsidies are used for paying portions of work-
ers’ wages and/or relocation costs.  Current subsidy rates are one-
fourth of wages (one-third for SMEs) for up to one year.  Other bene-
fits are moving costs (actual cost up to a prespecified limit), housing
costs (one-half of the cost paid by the employer for realtor fees and one
year’s rent), and special subsidies paid to firms for their new invest-
ment in plant and equipment and employment maintenance. 
Labor movement ability-development subsidy (rodo ido nory-
oku kaihatsu joseikin).  This subsidy is given to employers in special
employment-adjustment industries who provide workers with educa-
tion or training for the purpose of shukko, arranging for new jobs and
reassignment of workers to new lines of business.  The length of the
subsidy is for one year prior to the relocation of workers.  The subsidy
takes the following forms: i) two-thirds of the wages (three-fourths for
SMEs) with a maximum of 10,510 yen per day; ii) two-thirds of the
training cost (three-fourths for SMEs) with a maximum of 100,000
yen; and iii) a subsidy to relocation costs for workers who receive
retraining for new occupations.  Components (i) and (ii) are also avail-
able to employers in any industry who employ and train workers who
were laid off by firms belonging to special employment-adjustment
industries.
Lifetime ability-development subsidy (shogai noryoku kaihatsu
kyuhukin).  Three distinct activities are subsidized under this program.
“Ability-development subsidies” cover portions of employers’ cost of
training workers in their own company occupational skill-development
programs.  “Self-development subsidies” (jiko keihatsu josei kyuu-
hukin) reimburse a portion of employers’ subsidy to their workers’ cost
of receiving outside education and training.  Finally, a subsidy is also
available for the development and testing of officially recognized tests
of worker skill, the “skill evaluation promotion subsidy” (gino hyoka
sokushin kyuuhukin).
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Canada
Canada does not have a formal approach to government interven-
tion in declining industries like Japan’s.  However, there is a mosaic of
ad hoc initiatives and semi-permanent programs that perform a similar
function, although not on as large a scale.  The steel industry, for exam-
ple, experienced a large downturn in the last few decades and the fed-
eral government funded a multiyear Canadian Steel Trades Employ-
ment Congress to aid workers in retraining and job search.  Similar
programs received funding to aid workers displaced as a result of inter-
national trade agreements, such as the North American Free Trade
Agreement.  In general, large failing firms and organized industries
have frequently looked to the government for loan guarantees, tax con-
cessions, or other forms of support.  Although these “bailouts” are not
as common as they once were, they occur regularly and, typically, each
is a highly politicized event that is handled on an ad hoc basis by the
government in power.
As in Japan, Canada’s UI-EI system does play some role in
retraining and in the explicit subsidization of labor mobility.  UI-EI
offers retraining assistance, for example, and in 1994, 6.2 percent of
all UI weeks paid were in this category (combined with geographic
mobility assistance).  Furthermore, all formal tuition fees and moving
costs can be deducted from taxable income; so the government implic-
itly subsidizes all such activity.  Finally, there are smaller specialized
UI-EI programs to promote temporary work sharing, job creation, and
self-employment assistance, all of which have some parallels in the
Japanese EI system.  However, in 1994 these three specialized pro-
grams together accounted for only 1.5 percent of all UI benefit weeks
paid.
Unions
A country’s system of unionization is directly relevant to the expe-
riences of its displaced workers in at least two ways.  One of these is
the effect of unions on the entire distribution of pre- and postdisplace-
ment wages.  For example, one might expect displaced workers in an
economy with highly decentralized wage-setting institutions to face
more wage uncertainty than workers in a more centralized economy.
Second, unions sometimes intervene directly in the management of the
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displacement process.  We provide a brief discussion of the possible
effects of unions on displaced workers in Japan and Canada in this sec-
tion.
Japan
In Japan, like Canada and the United States, only a minority of
workers are unionized.  The Japanese unionization rate (union mem-
bers divided by the number of employed) peaked around 35.5 percent
in the 1970s and gradually declined to the current level of 24 percent.
As in Canada and the United States, unionization is highest in the gov-
ernment and public utilities sectors (about 67 percent), compared to 29
percent in manufacturing industries and 15 percent in the service sec-
tor.  Also like Canada and the United States, Japanese unions are
highly decentralized: the predominant form of private sector union in
Japan is organized at the enterprise level.  While legal provisions do
exist for the extension of collective bargaining agreements to nonunion
workers, these only set relatively low minimum wages within prefec-
tures (see the following section on minimum wages). 
Despite its low level of unionization and its enterprise-based struc-
ture, Japan’s collective bargaining does contain one element of central-
ized coordination not present in the United States and Canada.  This is
the annual unified negotiation process, which takes place every spring
between the Japanese Employers’ Federation and various associations
of labor unions (shunto).  Wage settlements in shunto are determined at
the firm level and vary across industries and firms, reflecting their
industry- and firm-specific performance.17 This process typically
determines the formulas for general and individual annual increases in
the level of regular pay.  The formulas for bonuses, which are paid
twice a year (usually in June and December), are also determined for
unionized workers during the period between early spring and June.
Bonuses generally constitute more than 25 percent of workers’ annual
pay and fluctuate more over time than regular (contract) pay.18
While nonunionized workers and government employees are not
covered by shunto, it is widely argued that shunto wage settlements
have a significant impact on the wages of these workers as well.
Although the process by which this occurs is hard to document, Teul-
ings and Hartog (1998), among others, have argued that this informal,
economy-wide wage coordination has important effects on the national
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wage structure.  If so, it is likely to have observable effects on the wage
changes experienced by displaced workers as well—a question we
address in detail later in this chapter.
Japanese unions also generally play at least some explicit role in
the management of the displacement process at the firm level.  Accord-
ing to the 1991 Survey of Labor-Management Agreements (Japan Min-
istry of Labor 1992), approximately 70 percent of unionized firms have
some formal rules for employer-union consultation regarding job rota-
tion, shukko, and rehiring of retired workers.  Ninety percent of these
firms have some formal rules for consultation regarding layoffs.  On
the other hand, a much smaller proportion of firms (30 percent) have
formal rules for consultation regarding employment matters resulting
from the introduction of new technology.  It is unknown how common
these arrangements are in nonunionized firms.
Canada
In 1997, Canada had a union membership rate of 31 percent of
employed persons, with about 34 percent of workers covered by a col-
lective bargaining agreement (Akyeampong 1997).  While this is more
than double the U.S. rate at that time, many aspects of Canada’s indus-
trial relations system are similar to that in the United States, from
which Canada adapted much of its collective bargaining legislation.19
Wage bargaining is done at the plant level, but not coordinated annu-
ally as in Japan.  Most agreements are two or three years in duration,
but this is an outcome of the bargaining process and single-year con-
tracts are not unheard of.  State-sanctioned extension of collectively
bargained wages to nonunionized workers is essentially non-existent.
As is well known, the average union/nonunion wage gap for observa-
tionally identical workers in North America is about 15 percent.  Fur-
thermore, relative to nonunion firms, North American unions compress
wages across skill levels (see Lemieux 1993).  Kuhn and Sweetman
(1998) showed that the loss of union status plays a very significant role
in the wage losses of Canadian displaced workers. 
In sum, only a minority of workers are union members in both
Canada and Japan.  While there is some coordination of wage settle-
ments in Japan, and some extension of union wage settlements to non-
union workers, both countries have quite decentralized wage-setting
mechanisms in which conditions at the level of the individual firm play
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large roles in the setting of wages.  Based on an examination of the col-
lective bargaining system, one would therefore expect considerable
dispersion in the wage outcomes of displaced workers in both coun-
tries, as compared, for example, with such highly centralized countries
as Denmark or Austria.
Minimum Wages
Minimum wages, like unions, affect the entire distribution of pre-
and postdisplacement wages.  They could thus affect the distribution of
wage changes experienced by displaced workers in each country.  
Japan
Unlike U.S. or Canadian minimum wages, which are hourly rates,
Japanese minimum wages are generally specified on a daily basis.
Like Canada (and to a much lesser extent the United States) Japanese
minimum wages vary among political subdivisions of the country,
which in Japan are called prefectures.  Unlike either the United States
or Canada, Japanese minimum wages also vary across industries.  Min-
imum wages are determined by Prefectural Minimum Wage Councils
and are set in two main ways.20
District minimum wages.  Each of the 47 prefectures has an over-
all minimum wage.  These minimum wages are applicable to all work-
ers including part-time workers, nonregular workers, and workers
under other types of employment contracts.  At the time of writing,
most of the prefectural minimum wages were set on October 1, 1997;
they range from 4,625 yen for Okinawa (lowest in the nation) to 5,368
yen for Tokyo and Kanagawa (highest).  
Industry minimum wages.  Within each prefecture, management
and unions can agree on higher minimum wages for certain industries.
There are currently 253 industry-level minimum wages of this type.
Examples include the pulp and paper industry in Toyama Prefecture
(5,637 yen, set on November 25, 1995); the pulp and paper industry in
Shizuoka Prefecture (5,848 yen, set on December 31, 1997); the steel
industry (5,487 yen in Oita; 5,970 in Tokyo; and 6,184 in Osaka); and
the retail automobile industry (4,630 in Okinawa; and 6,049 in
Saitama).  These industry-specific minimum wages, which do not have
Worker Displacement in Japan and Canada 219
a counterpart in Canada, may provide a channel whereby collectively
bargained wages affect the wages of unorganized workers, and—
because they exceed the overall district minimum—may work to com-
press wages in Japan more than minimum wages in Canada do.
Canada
As noted, minimum wages in Canada are a provincial responsibil-
ity, except for a small number of industries that are under federal juris-
diction, and are increased periodically on an ad hoc basis.  With the
exception of a small number of federally regulated industries, the mini-
mum wage does not vary across industries.  Benjamin, Gunderson, and
Riddell (1998) described the trend of a population-weighted average of
Canadian minimum wages.  In the mid 1970s it was about 50 percent
of the average manufacturing wage.  It fell over the subsequent decade
to about 35 percent and increased recently to about 38 percent. 
In sum, both Canada and Japan have minimum wages that are set
at subnational levels (provinces in Canada, prefectures and industry-
prefecture cells in Japan).  Clearly, these levels reflect local economic
conditions, as they tend to be higher in higher-wage jurisdictions.
Unlike Canada, Japan has a system of industry-specific minimum
wages that exceed general local mimina and provide a channel
whereby collectively bargained wages can affect nonunion wages.
Finally, minimum wages are not very high relative to mean wages in
either country.  This is shown in Table 3.4: Japan, Canada, and the
United States all have minimum wages between 36 and 38 percent of
mean wages (though the definitions of mean wages vary somewhat),
levels which are very low compared with France and Germany.  We
thus expect considerable heterogeneity in the wage outcomes experi-
enced by displaced workers in both countries, with perhaps somewhat
more legislation-induced wage compression in Japan than in Canada,
given Japan’s system of industry wage minima. 
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GENERAL ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 
In this section, we briefly describe the overall macroeconomic and
labor market conditions around the period (the mid 1990s) to which
most of our analysis applies.
Japan
As is well known, the mid 1990s was a period of deepening reces-
sion for the Japanese economy.  Unemployment rose from 2.1 percent
in 1990 to 4.1 percent in 1998, and the number of vacancies per job
seeker was cut by more than half, from 1.4 to 0.5.  This recession has
often been linked to the burst of the stock- and property-market bubble
in 1990.  The Nikkei stock price index climbed to its historical high of
38,916 yen on December 29, 1989.  The bubble burst in 1990, and the
Nikkei index fell to 20,222 yen on October 1, 1990 and then to 14,309
yen on August 18, 1992.  Another factor contributing to the recession
may have been Japan’s recent deindustrialization, driven in part by the
appreciation of the Japanese currency in the late 1980s.  It is estimated
that the fraction of overseas production in Japanese manufacturers’
overall sales revenue, which had been about 3 percent in 1985, had
risen to more than 8 percent by 1994 and was expected to approach 11
percent by 2000.  At the same time the share of manufactured goods in
total Japanese imports grew from 31 percent in 1985 to more than 55
percent in 1994.  These trends were reflected in the much steeper
declines in manufacturing employment than in overall employment
during the 1980s and 1990s, and could be expected to put unprece-
dented pressure on Japanese firms, especially in manufacturing, to
shed labor.  
Canada
Canada’s unemployment rate has been higher than Japan’s
throughout most of the postwar period and has exceeded that of the
United States since the early 1980s.  It peaked most recently in the
1992 recession at 11.3 percent, and declined only very slowly after that
to 9.2 percent in 1997.  The national number masks enormous regional
differences, however, that have persisted for decades.  Some areas have
Worker Displacement in Japan and Canada 221
unemployment rates that are approximately 20 percentage points
higher than others.  The rate of employment growth also slowed mark-
edly in the first half of the 1990s and the employment rate dropped
from a peak in the low 60 percent range in the late 1980s to just under
60 percent.
Thus, during the mid 1990s, economic conditions were moving in
opposite directions in Japan and Canada: deteriorating in Japan and
improving in Canada.  Despite this, it is important to note that there
was a huge gap in unemployment rates in favor of Japan: in 1995, the
Canadian unemployment rate of 9.5 percent was almost triple the Japa-
nese rate of 3.2.  This difference colors all discussion of comparative
displacement and reemployment rates in the two countries.  As we
shall see, it shows up in large differences in both displacement rates
and jobless durations among displaced workers in the two countries.
RATES OF SEPARATION AND DISPLACEMENT
Data
The goal of this section is to ascertain whether, and to what extent,
job displacement is more or less common in Japan than in Canada.  As
displacements are a subset of all job separations, we present results on
overall separation rates as well.  In addition, we wish to see whether
broad patterns of the incidence of separation and displacement among
demographic groups (essentially age and gender groups) are similar in
the two countries.
To accomplish this goal, we use one Japanese and two Canadian
data sets.  For Japan, we rely on the employment mobility survey
(EMS), with its relatively large sample of persons leaving and entering
firms.  For Canada, we use a very large sample of separations drawn
from administrative data collected by Human Resources Development
Canada (HRDC).  We supplement this with a much smaller, but richer,
survey of separators called the Canadian Out-of-Employment Panel
(COEP).
Japan’s employment mobility survey (“Survey of Employment
Trends”) is an establishment survey that is conducted twice a year by
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the Ministry of Labor.  The two surveys for each year (typically con-
ducted during the periods July 1 to July 31 and January 16 to February
15) cover the employment changes which have taken place at surveyed
establishments during the periods January 1 to June 30 and July 1 to
December 31, respectively.  This survey began in essentially the
present form in 1964.  Privately and publicly owned establishments
with at least five employees in the following nine industries are cov-
ered: mining, construction, manufacturing, public utilities, transporta-
tion and communications, retail/wholesale and restaurants, finance/
insurance, real estate, and service.  In 1995, 14,000 establishments
were surveyed.  In addition to establishments’ characteristics, the sur-
vey collects information on three subsets of their workers: 1) those
who were hired during the six-month reference period, 2) those who
left the firm during that period, and 3) those who experienced transfers
from one establishment to another within the same firm (intrafirm
transfers).  For 1995, the workers surveyed comprise about 130,000
new hires, 120,000 departures, and 50,000 within-firm transfers.  In
this section we use the “departures” sample to compute separation and
displacement rates; later we use the “hires” sample to examine the con-
sequences of displacement.21  We do not use the third, “transfers,” sam-
ple.
The Canadian administrative data we use is collected as a by-prod-
uct of administering the employment insurance system.  Whenever a
separation occurs, a Canadian employer is expected to submit to
HRDC a form called a “Record of Employment” (ROE).22  ROE forms
contain information on the date and (firm-reported) reason for the sep-
aration, an indication of whether the separation is expected to be per-
manent or temporary, plus some limited demographic and firm
information (including age, gender, job tenure, and firm size).  Both
the worker and firm are identified, so it is possible to see whether the
person returned to the original firm after the separation. 
Time series of separation rates based on the above data have
recently been published in a series of Statistics Canada working papers
(Picot and Lin 1996; Picot, Lin and Pyper 1997; Lin and Pyper 1997);
these rates are not comparable to Japanese data derived from the
employment mobility survey, however, for a number of reasons.  In
particular, the Japanese survey on which our results are based is
restricted to establishments with five or more employees, to jobs last-
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ing at least a month, and to a large but not exhaustive set of industries
(for example, most of the public sector is excluded).  To adjust for
these differences (some of which make a considerable difference to the
numbers), Garnett Picot and Leonard Landry of Statistics Canada have
generously provided us with revised figures that impose the same
restrictions as the Japanese numbers. 
As mentioned, supplementary information on separating workers
in Canada is available in a series of surveys called the COEPs.  These
use ROE forms as the sampling frame for a telephone survey which
asks detailed questions about old and new jobs, unemployment dura-
tions, and search activities, among other items.  In our work here, we
use two merged COEP surveys: those which surveyed workers dis-
placed between January and June of 1993 and of 1995.  In 1995 this
survey was conducted in two panels (or waves) approximately 8–9 and
13–14 months after the event; the 1993 survey had a third panel
between these dates.  Although much smaller in size than the Japanese
employment mobility survey, the COEP gives us a comparable and
representative sample of separations, combined with detailed informa-
tion on their subsequent labor-force status and wages.  
Separation and Displacement Rates
Total annual separation rates, calculated from the 1995 Japanese
employment mobility survey and comparably defined Canadian
administrative data, are presented in the first and third columns of
Table 3.5.  These rates give the annual number of separations from jobs
which have lasted one month or more, from firms with five or more
workers, expressed as a fraction of the employed population in June of
1995.23
Overall, the differences are striking: employed Canadian men are
much more likely to experience a separation than Japanese men, with a
separation rate of 35.9 percent, essentially triple the Japanese rate of
11.9 percent.  The difference is considerably less dramatic for women,
whose separation rates are essentially identical to men’s in Canada, but
much higher than men’s in Japan.  Thus Canadian women’s separation
rate (34.1 percent) is not even double that of Japanese women (18.3
percent).  Ignoring teenagers, separation rates in both Canada and
Japan seem to be U-shaped in age, especially in Japan, and especially
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for men.24  Thus jobs are most stable for prime-age workers in both
countries, as one might expect from a number of models, including
job-shopping models and models where retirement is followed by one
or more casual jobs.
To what extent are these apparently massive differences in turn-
over between Canada and Japan “real,” in the sense that they actually
result in a worker moving from one firm to another?  With the excep-
tion of some shukko assignments, which are relatively infrequent, Japa-
nese separations, especially as reported in Table 3.5, are essentially all
permanent.25 As in the United States, however, temporary layoffs con-
stitute a large fraction of separations in Canada.  To correct for this, the
second column excludes from the count of separations all those work-
ers who were observed working for their preseparation employer in the
year following the separation.  This dramatically reduces the Canadian
separation rate, to the point where comparably defined permanent sep-
aration rates are very similar in Canada (16.8 percent) and Japan (14.3
percent).  Previous analyses have often missed this because they
included the huge volume of temporary separations in North American
economies.
This overall similarity in permanent separation rates, however,
obscures offsetting patterns by gender: in line with expectations, Japa-
nese men do turn over substantially less than Canadian men (11.9 ver-
sus 16.8 percent per year), but this is offset by higher employment
instability among Japanese women (18.3 versus 15.7 percent turnover).
Overall rates also obscure a different age pattern in the two economies:
while turnover is U-shaped with age in both, the ranking of the two
countries is different at the top and bottom of the age distribution.26
Consistent with a “job shopping” model, young Canadian workers,
especially those in their 20s, turn over much more than workers in all
other age categories.  There is also some evidence of job shopping in
Japan, but in stark contrast to Canada, the highest turnover rates in
Japan are actually found among the oldest workers, aged 60 and over.
These workers actually turn over much more rapidly in Japan than in
Canada, suggesting the importance of both mandatory retirement and a
casual labor market among “retirees.” 
Thus we find that overall permanent separation rates are not that
different in Japan and Canada, but what about worker displacements,
or the subset of separations that are involuntary from the worker’s
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point of view?  If a larger fraction of permanent turnover in Japan is
voluntary, it may still be the case that displacement is less common
there.  We confront this issue in Table 3.6, which presents the distribu-
tion of firm-reported reasons for separation in Japan (from published
EMS data), and Table 3.7, which examines both firm- and worker-
reported reasons for separation in the Canadian COEP data.
In Table 3.6, the separation reason that corresponds most closely to
what North Americans mean by layoffs is the “management conve-
nience” category.  In Japan in 1995, this category of separations consti-
tuted 8.7 percent of total separations, with a higher share for men (11.3
percent) than women (6.0 percent).  Notably, this low “layoff” share
includes shukko assignments, which do not result in unemployment;
thus a count of layoffs that might conceivably cause unemployment
would be even lower.  At the same time, however, this rate does not
include contract expirations or mandatory retirements, which might be
considered a form of displacement.  All told, total involuntary separa-
tions—which consist primarily of those based on the three reasons just
mentioned—account for about one-third of all separations in Japan,
with a higher involuntary share for men than women.  The involuntary
share increases strongly with age, echoing our earlier notion that job
security falls with age in Japan.  Importantly, this increase is not just
due to mandatory retirement, which is important only for workers over
55 in these data.  The great bulk of the increase in involuntary separa-
tions with age is in the “management convenience” category, which
includes shukko.  In stark contrast (as we shall see) to Canada, the vast
majority of separations for all workers under 54 are voluntary; for both
women and men, most of these voluntary separations are not related to
marriage, childbirth, or nursing care.
For Canada, unlike Japan, the COEP survey allows a detailed
examination of reported reasons for separation, including information
on both the firm’s and worker’s perceptions.  The employer’s per-
ceived separation reasons are those reported on the ROE form, which
asks employers to choose one of 13 permitted answers: shortage of
work (layoff), labor dispute, return to school, injury or illness, volun-
tary departure (quit), pregnancy, retirement, participation in a work-
sharing program, apprenticeship, age 65, dismissal (for cause), leave of
absence, and “other.”27  In addition to this information, however, the
first panel of the COEP household survey asks each worker the pri-
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mary reason for which the job ended.  Only those whose self-reported
reason for separation was either quit, dismissed or fired, laid off, injury
or illness, or “other” were allowed to complete this survey (the survey
was quickly terminated for separations due to retirement, maternity,
labor dispute, and so forth, and these separations are not included in
our data).28
Table 3.7 presents a cross-tabulation of firm- and self-reported rea-
sons for separation for participants in the COEP survey.  Interestingly,
there is a divergence of opinion as to the nature of the separation in a
substantial number of cases.  For men (women) about 13 percent (7
percent) of those who label their separation as a quit have the separa-
tion labeled as a layoff by the firm.  Almost 14 percent of women (11
percent of men) who said they quit were actually dismissed (i.e., termi-
nated for cause) according to their employers.  Further, only 60 percent
of men (68 percent of women) whose separations are labeled as volun-
tary departures by firms label themselves as quits.  While 89 percent of
men (87 percent of women) reported by the firm as being laid off (a
separation attributed to a shortage of work, that is, economic reasons)
report themselves as having been laid off, only 76 percent of men (64
percent of women) who report that they were laid off are declared as
such by the firm.  A large part of this discrepancy results from the
“other” category, which firms are much more likely to use than work-
ers, but the number of separations labeled as quits by firms that are
declared to be layoffs by workers is quite large, about 24 percent for
men and 14 percent for women. 
Overall, however, while Table 3.7 shows some discrepancy
between worker and firm perceptions, it suggests that the large interna-
tional differences we observe in the labeling of separations are com-
mon to workers and firms.  In particular, no matter whether the
worker’s or the firm’s label is used, a much higher share of separations
in Canada (relative to Japan) are employer-initiated.  Depending on
whose label is used, layoffs constitute 62–72 percent of separations for
men, and 48–65 percent for women.  One reason for this might be Can-
ada’s UI-EI system, which disqualifies all workers labeled as quitters
from benefits.  This feature, combined with a lack of employer experi-
ence rating, might lead a much larger fraction of separations to be
labeled as layoffs, even by the employer.  Another reason might simply
be cultural differences in labeling.  It is sometimes claimed, for exam-
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ple, that a considerable number of forced resignations are reported
under the category of voluntary separations in Japan, to preserve public
appearances.  If this is the case, our statistics in this section may under-
estimate the real rate of layoffs in Japan.  We return to this issue in the
section called “Combining Incidence and Consequences” (p. 243),
which proposes and analyzes a definition of displacement that is not
dependent on reported reasons for separation to make international
comparisons.  To anticipate, we find that the larger voluntary share in
Japan is not illusory.
Given the rough similarity in overall permanent separation rates,
plus the larger share of separations labeled as involuntary in Canada,
one would expect the overall rate of displacement—of permanent,
involuntary separation—to be higher in Canada than in Japan.  This
expectation is confirmed overall by Table 3.8, which presents our best
estimates of displacement rates in the two countries.  The Canadian
numbers come from administrative data from Picot, Lin, and Pyper
(1997) and simply restrict attention to separations labeled as due to
“shortage of work” by the employer on the ROE form.29  For Japan, the
last three columns combine the published information in Tables 3.5
and 3.6 (multiplying separation rates by the fraction of separations in
each category) to generate three alternative definitions of displacement
rates.
According to Table 3.8, overall displacement rates are lower in
Japan, no matter what definition of displacement is used.  The overall
annual displacement rate in Canada was 4.9 percent in 1995: condi-
tional on being employed at least a month and on working for a firm
with at least 5 employees, about 1 in 20 workers is permanently laid off
each year in Canada.  According to the narrowest definition of dis-
placement in Japan (separations due to management convenience
only), this fraction is only 1.2 percent, or 1 in 83 workers.  This number
would be even lower if we excluded shukko workers from the count of
Japanese workers; these workers do not experience any unemployment
and (as we shall see) face much more muted wage changes than those
in other separations.  The Japanese displacement rate rises substan-
tially, to 2.7 percent, if we count workers whose temporary contracts
end as being displaced.30  Because they involve permanent, and (pre-
sumably) involuntary employment terminations, contract expirations
may be considered a kind of displacement; as they typically involve
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short jobs and are not unanticipated, however, they may not be fully
equivalent to layoffs.  Finally, if mandatory retirements are included in
the count of Japanese displacements, the overall displacement rate rises
to 3.5 percent, still below the Canadian rate of 4.9 percent but much
less dramatically so.31
Is the international difference in displacement rates shown in Table
3.8 an artifact of special features of work organization in one or two
industries?  One might imagine, for example, that the construction
industry in Canada accounts for a very large share of annual separa-
tions nationwide.  In that industry, many workers have a permanent
affiliation to a craft rather than an employer and cycle through a large
number of jobs with different employers in a given year.  This is a fun-
damentally different form of labor market organization than almost all
other industries.  To check for this, we were able to generate separation
and displacement rates for two roughly comparable industry groups—
construction and manufacturing—for 1995 in both countries, according
to the definitions used in Tables 3.5 and 3.8.  The figures are for men
and women combined.  For construction, we find separation rates of 54
percent in Canada, but the permanent separation rate is only 22 per-
cent.  This compares to a permanent separation rate of 15 percent in
Japan.  The permanent layoff rate is 17.7 percent in Canada, compared
to 1.1 percent in Japan, according to the “management convenience”
definition in Table 3.8.  Thus there is indeed a huge difference in dis-
placement rates between the two countries in the construction industry.
For manufacturing, the separation rate is 49 percent in Canada, but per-
manent separations are only 17.3 percent, compared to 12.1 percent in
Japan.  Manufacturing displacement rates, as defined above, are 6.1
percent in Canada and 1.1 percent in Japan.  Thus, looking just at man-
ufacturing, the international difference in displacement rates is smaller
than in construction, but still very large.  Indeed the rates for manufac-
turing are quite similar to those for the economy as a whole.  We con-
clude that the differences seen in Table 3.8 are not an artifact of how
the construction industry, or any other single industry, is organized.
Two other noteworthy features of Table 3.8 are the following.
First, perhaps surprisingly, displacement rates are quite similar for Jap-
anese men and women, but are considerably higher for Canadian men
than Canadian women.  In part due to differences in industry mix (men
are overrepresented in construction, primary, and manufacturing indus-
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tries) and to interindustry differences in adjustment patterns (the above
industries have more volatile product demand and rely more on layoffs
as an adjustment mechanism), displacement is thus disproportionately
a “male” phenomenon in Canada.  Second, and even more striking, are
the opposite age patterns in Canada and Japan, which are particularly
stark for men: displacement rates fall with age in Canada but increase
with age in Japan.  While mandatory retirement clearly plays some
role here, Table 3.8 indicates that much more than this is going on:
both layoffs due to “management convenience” and finishing a tempo-
rary contract also increase substantially with age in Japan.  This trend
highlights a key difference between the job markets of the two coun-
tries, which we explore further below: although Canadian workers
operate in a less-secure job market overall, their job security tends to
increase as they age, in part due to rising seniority levels and the wide-
spread practice of ordering layoffs by inverse seniority.  In Japan, the
opposite occurs: while young workers experience very high job secu-
rity, this security erodes with age, as more and more workers are forced
out among the older age groups.  Even excluding mandatory retire-
ments, the displacement rate for Japanese workers over the age of 55
actually exceeds the Canadian displacement rate for workers of the
same age.
In sum, our analysis of separation and displacement rates in Can-
ada and Japan shows the following.  There are large differences in total
separation rates between Japan and Canada, with Canadian separations
being much more frequent.  Because a large fraction of Canadian sepa-
rations are temporary (involving a return to the original employer), dif-
ferences in permanent separations between the two countries are
however much more modest.  In fact this difference is reversed for
women, who have a higher permanent separation rate in Japan than
Canada.  Finally, if we restrict attention to those separations that are
labeled as firm-initiated (or as “layoffs”), the difference between Cana-
dian and Japanese separation rates (which we can now consider as
“displacement rates”) again becomes much wider.  The reason is that in
Japan, a much larger share of separations tends to be labeled as “volun-
tary” from the worker’s point of view.  An implication, of course, is
that the total rate of voluntary separation must actually be greater in
Japan than in Canada; understanding this phenomenon would seem to
be an important goal for further research.
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The Permanence of Layoffs
A final, but key, element in our description of displacement rates in
the two countries is a closer understanding of the North American phe-
nomenon of temporary layoffs; as noted above, a very large fraction of
separations in Canada involves a temporary sojourn on employment
insurance, followed by recall to the preseparation employer.  When
workers are laid off in Canada, how certain are they about their recall
prospects?  Do their expectations coincide with the firm’s, and how
well do both parties’ expectations predict what actually happens?
These questions have important implications for workers’ search strat-
egies and provide a useful contrast to the Japanese case, where separa-
tions (except for certain types of shukko) almost always involve a
permanent severing of ties with the employer.  We use the COEP to
answer these questions in Tables 3.9 and 3.10. 
Table 3.9 contrasts worker and firm recall expectations among the
subset of workers from Table 3.7 who are labeled as a layoff by either
party.  The firm data are from the ROE form which is filled out near the
time of separation.  The worker expectations are retrospective: workers
were asked at the time of the first survey what their expectation was
when the job ended.  By this time, workers had had an opportunity to
see the ROE form.  On average, the fraction of laid-off women expect-
ing recall (46.5 percent) is quite similar to the fraction of women
employers expected to recall (49.2 percent).  For men there is a some-
what larger gap, with 47.4 percent of workers expecting recall com-
pared to 55.7 percent of firms.  At the individual level, however, there
are much larger differences in expectations; 34 percent of men (36 per-
cent of women) who indicated that they expected to be recalled, for
example, were not listed by the firm as workers they planned to recall. 
Recall realizations are contrasted with expectations in Table 3.10
for the subset of workers from Table 3.9 who were reemployed by their
last survey date (these are the only workers for whom we can identify
the postseparation firm).32  Clearly, neither firms nor workers are very
reliable predictors of recall.  For men, about 62 percent of workers who
expected to be recalled and 51 percent of the workers firms expected to
recall were actually back with their former employer.  The correspond-
ing numbers for women are about 70 percent and 63 percent.  (This
could reflect workers’ exercising their option to search while unem-
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ployed, locating new jobs, and then declining the recall when it
arrives.)33  Perhaps more surprisingly, about 14 percent of the men and
15 percent of the women who expected not to be recalled were in fact
reemployed by their former employer, and 33 percent of men and 35
percent of women with no indication of recall on their ROE were actu-
ally recalled.  This suggests a reluctance by some firms to indicate an
even weak commitment to recall workers in the face of uncertainty.
In sum, both the divergence in individual workers’ and firms’
expectations of recall and the inaccuracy of both firms’ and workers’
predictions of whether recall will occur mean that, in many cases, dis-
placement in Canada does not constitute a sharp and well-defined
event.  Workers on EI may search at a low intensity for several months
waiting to see whether they will be recalled or not.  In contrast to
Japan, where displacement constitutes a short, sharp, and permanent
break with the firm, this more drawn-out process may contribute to the
longer unemployment durations among displaced workers in Canada.
We turn to this issue in the next section.  
LABOR-FORCE TRANSITIONS AFTER DISPLACEMENT
In the previous section we established that, with the possible
exception of older men, worker displacement is less common in Japan
than in Canada.  In this section we begin our analysis of the conse-
quences of displacement in the two countries, focusing on the amount
of time it takes displaced workers to find new jobs.  In particular, we
are interested in whether Japanese workers “pay” for their greater job
security with worse unemployment consequences in the event of invol-
untary job loss.  Because so few workers are displaced, are the few
workers who are displaced seen by the labor market as “lemons,” thus
experiencing very long unemployment durations?  Relatedly, does the
widely cited “thinness” of Japanese labor markets for mid-career work-
ers manifest itself in much longer unemployment durations of laid-off
workers?  Finally, we are also interested in the empirical correlates of
long-term unemployment: are the same kinds of workers likely to
experience long durations in both countries, or do patterns differ? 
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Table 3.11 contains our main results on the relative unemployment
durations of displaced workers in Canada and Japan.  The Japanese fig-
ures in that table are calculated from a special survey of workers enter-
ing unemployment, conducted in conjunction with the Japanese labor
force survey in 1996 and 1997 (Japan Ministry of Labor 1996, 1997).
This survey specifically interviewed workers who were employed one
year before the survey date and experienced a separation within the
prior 12 months.  Individuals who had dropped out of the labor force
(were neither working nor looking for work at the survey date) were
not interviewed.  With a sample size of about 5,200 persons, this spe-
cial survey is small compared to the Employment Mobility Survey, but
unlike that survey (and like the COEP) it contains relatively detailed
information on jobless durations for an inflow-based sample.  Our sam-
ple of displaced workers from this survey consists of all separations
due to layoffs, bankruptcy, a decline in business, and other “manage-
ment convenience” reasons.34  This sample does not include workers
on shukko, as such workers generally experience no unemployment.
Both Japanese and Canadian samples, however, do include individuals
who, despite being involuntarily and permanently terminated, moved
directly into another job with no intervening joblessness.35
Canadian figures in Table 3.11 are based on the COEP survey.
Canadian displaced workers are defined as those experiencing a sepa-
ration due to a self-reported “layoff” who do not return to their presep-
aration employer within the (approximately) one-year panel of the
COEP survey.  For comparability with the Japanese statistics (which
drop individuals who are not in the labor force on the single survey
date on which they were interviewed), we impose two alternative
restrictions on the Canadian sample: “Canada A” drops individuals
who were out of the labor force at every date on which they were inter-
viewed after the separation; Canada B drops individuals who were out
of the labor force at any of the (postseparation) interview dates.36
Together, results from these two samples should bracket what would
be obtained from a sampling strategy identical to the Japanese one.
The numbers presented in Table 3.11 are cumulative reemploy-
ment rates derived from a Kaplan-Meier estimate of the survivor func-
tion.  The Kaplan-Meier technique provides a simple way to adjust for
the effect of censoring in the data, which is empirically fairly impor-
tant: in Japan, 31 percent of men’s and 30 percent of women’s dura-
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tions were censored; in Canada this fraction was higher, at 32 and 42
percent, respectively.  Cumulative reemployment rates give the frac-
tion of workers whose completed jobless durations are estimated to
have ended by a specific amount of time after the layoff, and, by defi-
nition, cannot decrease with elapsed time. 
Overall, the message of Table 3.11 is clear: even though displace-
ment is much less common in Japan, Japanese displaced workers do
not take longer to become reemployed than Canadian displaced work-
ers.  In contrast, their durations are much shorter, with a median of just
under two months for both men and women, compared with between
five and six months for Canadian men and between seven and nine
months for Canadian women.  Two months after displacement, over
half of Japanese workers are reemployed, compared with under 30 per-
cent of Canadian workers (according to either Canadian sample).  Six
months later, about three-quarters are reemployed in Japan compared
with about 52 and 42 percent of Canadian men and women, respec-
tively.  It is worth reemphasizing that these results apply to involun-
tarily terminated workers only, and that they hold in spite of the fact
that a much smaller fraction of separations are involuntary in Japan,
and of the fact that we have excluded shukko workers (who experience
involuntary mobility but no unemployment) from our calculations.
Accounting for these factors would only widen the gap between
Japan’s low unemployment durations and Canada’s higher ones. 
Clearly, we do not find any evidence that “thinness” of mid-career
labor markets or a “lemons” phenomenon hurts Japanese displaced
workers, at least relative to Canadian ones.  Instead, two other factors
seem likely to be at work.  One is simply the higher overall Canadian
unemployment rate: as noted, despite the Japanese recession, unem-
ployment rates in Japan were less than half of Canadian rates at the
time of these surveys.  The second may be the distinctly North Ameri-
can issue of recall expectations: the lack of a clean break with the old
employer (even in the current sample of ex post permanent layoffs)
may discourage search for a new job, thus contributing to the higher
unemployment durations of Canadian displaced workers.
Results from modeling the impact of covariates on the reemploy-
ment hazard are presented in Tables 3.12 and 3.13 for Japan and Can-
ada, respectively.  In both cases we use a Cox partial likelihood
specification, which assumes the covariates have a proportional effect
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on the hazard and allows for a fully general baseline hazard rate.  The
reported coefficients give the effect of each covariate on the log of the
reemployment hazard.  In Japan (Table 3.12), both the number of
observed covariates and the sample size are small, and very few
observed characteristics have a statistically significant effect on the
hazard rate.  A significant exception is that part-time workers, espe-
cially women, have higher reemployment hazards (and hence shorter
jobless durations) than full-time workers.  In addition, workers dis-
placed from industry 14 (“other” industries, not elsewhere classified)
have much lower hazards, and hence longer jobless durations, than the
omitted industry, manufacturing. 
In Canada we have both a larger sample and a more exhaustive set
of covariates; as a result we are able to show quite a lot more about pat-
terns in jobless durations in Table 3.13.  All regressions in this table use
the “Canada A” sample described earlier, though the results change
very little when the smaller, “Canada B” sample is used.  The specifica-
tions in columns 3 and 6 attempt to replicate the Japanese analysis in
Table 3.12 as closely as possible.  In contrast to Japan, these two
regressions show that demographic and (predisplacement) firm charac-
teristics matter a lot for the jobless durations of Canadian displaced
workers.  In particular, for men, lower reemployment rates are found
among single workers, those displaced from firms with under 20 work-
ers (the omitted category), visible minorities, and high-tenure workers.
Age has a U-shaped effect on reemployment rates.  All these patterns
also hold for women, with two exceptions.  Being single has the oppo-
site, though not significant, effect—raising the reemployment hazard—
and education has a strong, positive effect on reemployment rates (high
school diploma is the omitted category).  In contrast to Japan, being a
part-time worker has no significant effect on reemployment rates, at
least in the comparably specified regressions of columns 3 and 6. 
The remaining columns in Table 3.13 add extra controls to check
for the robustness of the correlations identified above.  Columns 1 and
4 add a measure of predisplacement union coverage and province fixed
effects; columns 2 and 5 add these plus the predisplacement wage—as
a proxy for individual characteristics observable to the previous
employer, but not to the econometrician.  Interestingly, unionization is
associated with a much higher reemployment hazard for men, but has
no impact for women.  In addition, and perhaps surprisingly, while the
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predisplacement wage (mean about 13.5) has a strong effect for men, it
has no effect at all for women.  Looking across the three specifications,
most of the coefficient estimates are not strongly affected by the inclu-
sion of additional controls. 
In addition to reemployment rates, the COEP provides some
related information concerning the search and employment behavior of
displaced Canadians.  For example, by the first survey date, 5.6 percent
of Canadian displaced workers had started their own businesses after
being laid off.  Overall, 7.3 percent considered themselves to be self-
employed at the first survey, 4.0 percent full-time and 3.3 percent part-
time.  But 28 percent of those who were full-time self-employed, and
51 percent of those who were part-time, were also searching for
another job at that point.  This compares favorably with the set of all
workers reemployed at that point; 58 percent of all workers who were
reemployed at the first survey date reported that they were still search-
ing for another job.  The fact that many Canadian displaced workers
continue searching for other jobs even after becoming reemployed,
combined (as we shall see) with the much higher fraction of Canadian
displaced workers whose first postseparation job pays very much less
than their previous one, suggests that postdisplacement “job shopping”
may play a more important role in how Canadian workers “recover”
from displacement than it does for Japanese workers.
WAGE CHANGES
In this section we conduct an econometric analysis of the wage
changes experienced by displaced workers, using data from the 1993
and 1995 COEP for Canada and the 1995 Employment Mobility Sur-
vey for Japan.  We first present comparable descriptive information on
the distribution of wage changes, by age and sex, in both countries.
We then examine the structure of displacement-induced wage changes
in a regression framework.  In both countries we compare the experi-
ences of displaced workers to those of all workers experiencing a job
separation.  The Canadian sample of displaced workers consists of all
permanent layoffs; in Japan we present results for two kinds of dis-
placed workers: workers undergoing shukko and those experiencing
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other involuntary terminations (management convenience, contract
expiration, and mandatory retirement).37 The survey defines shukko
workers as those who move to work under another employer’s com-
mand by company order, or by agreement with another employer,
regardless of their formal form of employment affiliation (Japan Min-
istry of Labor 1997a, p. 357). 
The Distribution of Displacement-Induced Wage Changes 
Detailed information on the distribution of wage changes experi-
enced by Japanese job changers in the Employment Mobility Survey is
provided in Table 3.14.  As noted, Table 3.14 presents results for three
groups of workers: all separations, workers undergoing shukko, and all
other involuntary separations.  The Japanese EMS does not ask work-
ers directly about the level of preseparation wages; rather, it simply
presents workers with the five percentage-change categories listed in
the table and asks them to choose one.  This makes it difficult to
present results for mean wage changes, of course; we do provide a
rough estimate of a mean, however, by assigning values to each cate-
gory.38  Finally, recall that, by definition, only workers who are reem-
ployed after a separation can be included in these wage-change
calculations and that the wage information refers to monthly wages
excluding bonuses. 
According to Table 3.14, the average Japanese male who changed
jobs in 1995 experienced a 2.2 percent wage gain; if he changed jobs
involuntarily without undergoing shukko, he lost 4.3 percent in wages.
Closer examination of the data, however, reveals that the latter loss is
entirely attributable to workers over 45 years of age: on average men
under this age experience a mean wage gain after an involuntary sepa-
ration.  Men above 55, on the other hand, experience very large mean
wage losses, many of which may be associated with mandatory retire-
ment and with low-wage or part-time work after retirement.  Indeed,
the incidence of very large wage reductions among older men who sep-
arate involuntarily is remarkable, with almost 40 percent experiencing
a wage reduction of over 30 percent.  Also, again especially for men, a
significant fraction of job changers (both overall and involuntary)
experience wage gains, a fraction which declines strongly with age.
Finally, the distribution of wage changes among workers undergoing
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shukko contrasts very strongly with the other distributions in Table
3.14: a much higher fraction of shukko workers experience wage stabil-
ity across old and new jobs, with almost 90 percent experiencing a
change of less than 10 percent in absolute value.  The fact that, at least
for a limited time, the old employer continues to pay the wage of such
workers almost certainly contributes to this wage stability.  These
trends differ in two main ways for women.  First, large wage reduc-
tions among older women undergoing permanent separations are much
less common than among men.  This reflects, at least in part, the less
frequent use of mandatory retirement in women’s labor contracts.  Sec-
ond, shukko is very rare among women in Japan.
Table 3.15 gives comparable numbers for Canada.  As noted, these
are derived from the merged 1993 and 1995 COEP surveys.  Unlike the
Japanese EMS, the COEP asked persons surveyed the actual level of
wages in both the pre- and postseparation jobs; Table 3.15 uses these
responses to compute percentage changes.39  The table thus provides an
actual mean wage change and an estimated mean using the same values
as were assigned to the various categories in Japan, for comparability.
In contrast to Japan, however, the Canadian wage data refer to hourly
wages, a fact that is important to bear in mind when interpreting regres-
sion results on part-time work below. 
The following trends are evident from an examination of Table
3.15.  First, as in Japan, displaced workers under the age of about 45 do
not experience economically significant mean wage losses.  Also, as in
Japan, mean wage changes among displaced workers, as well as among
all separations, become more negative with age, but the decline is
much less dramatic.  Indeed, the fraction of displaced men experienc-
ing large wage losses appears uncorrelated with age in Canada; the
declining mean is largely due to a fall in the fraction of large, displace-
ment-induced wage gains with age. 
The clearest contrast in wage change patterns between Japan and
Canada concerns their variance.  Looking specifically at prime-age
men (say, age 30–39, before mandatory retirement becomes an issue in
Japan), and at the non-shukko involuntary separations in both coun-
tries, it is clear that the fraction of displaced workers experiencing
wage changes of more than 30 percent in absolute value is much
greater in Canada (17.20 + 14.66 = 31.86 percent) than in Japan (5.14 +
3.81 = 8.95 percent for 30- to 34-year-olds and 4.67 + 3.63 = 8.30 per-
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cent for 35- to 44-year-olds).  This is particularly noteworthy when we
recall that the Japanese figures are monthly wages, and thus they incor-
porate any monthly hours variation between jobs.  This lower variance
in wage changes in Japan is striking, given the relatively decentralized
wage-setting regimes in both Japan and Canada.  It may, however,
reflect greater opportunities to extend collectively bargained wage set-
tlements to nonunion workers, and industry minimum wages that
reduce wage dispersion, in Japan.  It clearly reflects something other
than the institution of shukko, since it is very apparent even when
shukko workers are excluded from the sample. 
Finally, while (due to this greater dispersion) most age groups are
much less likely to experience a large wage reduction when changing
jobs in Japan than in Canada, the reverse is true for older workers,
especially men separating involuntarily.  Thus, our results again reaf-
firm the notion that adjustment burdens in Japan fall much more dis-
proportionately on older workers than in Canada: not only does the
involuntary separation rate rise with age (as we saw in the previous
section), but so do the chances that such a separation will result in a
large wage loss. 
A reader might be surprised by the very small mean wage losses
reported in Table 3.15 for older Canadian workers.  Doesn’t this con-
tradict a large U.S. and Canadian literature which shows large wage
losses among older displaced North American workers?  The resolu-
tion to this puzzle can be found in Table 3.16, which breaks down
Canadians’ wage changes by tenure instead of age, and in Table 3.17,
which provides supplementary information on the distribution of ten-
ure by age in the two countries.  Now, sizable mean losses (of 11.0 per-
cent for men and 6.6 percent for women) are evident among workers
with high tenure levels (more than 10 years), and losses increase rather
steadily with tenure on the lost job.  It therefore does not follow from
Tables 3.14 and 3.15 that the Canadian labor market is kinder to high-
tenure displaced workers than the Japanese market: the small wage
losses of older Canadian displaced workers could be due largely to rel-
atively low mean tenure levels among older workers in Canada relative
to Japan.
Unfortunately, we do not have access to information about tenure
levels of Japanese displaced workers in our microdata sample.  How-
ever, the fact that older Japanese workers have higher tenure levels
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than older Canadian workers is documented in Table 3.17, which is
based on calculations from general household surveys in both coun-
tries.  This is especially the case for men; for example, a randomly
selected, employed 50- to 54-year-old Japanese man has been on his
current job for 22 years.  The analogous figure for Canada is 14.7
years.40 Women’s age-specific tenure levels are remarkably similar in
Japan and Canada.  The other noteworthy feature of Table 3.17 is what
happens after age 55: conditional on remaining employed, mean tenure
continues to rise with age among Canadian workers, even past 65.
This is not the case in Japan, at least for men, where the widespread
practice of taking a low-wage “postretirement” job clearly shows up in
the data.
The Structure of Displacement-Induced Wage 
Changes: Japan versus Canada 
In this subsection we present regression analyses of displacement-
induced wage changes in Japan and Canada.  The goal is to see whether
the same observable factors accentuate, or mitigate, wage losses expe-
rienced by displaced workers in both countries.  As in the previous sub-
section, for Canada we present separate results for all permanent
separations and for permanently laid-off workers.  For Japan we con-
sider three populations: all separations, workers undergoing shukko,
and layoffs. 
The Japanese results are presented for men and women separately
in Tables 3.18 and 3.19.  The dependent variable in all regressions is
the percentage wage change reported by the (reemployed) worker;
because both tails of this dependent variable are truncated, we use cen-
sored regression models for doubly truncated dependent variables.41
For the “laid-off” and “shukko” samples, we report separate specifica-
tions with and without controls for industry wage premiums.  The latter
specification is for comparability with the Canadian data, when we
cannot compute a similar variable.
Three main patterns are clear in Tables 3.18 and 3.19.  First, as the
“All Separations” column of both tables indicates (and as the simple
wage-change distributions examined above suggested), separation rea-
son matters.  With the exception of workers experiencing outward
shukko, who experience a small wage gain, workers experiencing
240 Abe, Higuchi, Kuhn, Nakamura, and Sweetman
involuntary separations experience larger wage losses than do volun-
tary separations.  In particular, laid-off men (in other words, involun-
tary, non-shukko separations) are likely to lose 5 percent more in wages
than men separating voluntarily.  The somewhat surprising wage gains
among outward-shukko workers might reflect pay incentives employ-
ers provide for encouraging workers to accept shukko assignments (to
new jobs) willingly.  Such incentives disappear as workers on shukko
assignments are called back. 
Second, among involuntary separations, the patterns of wage
changes are very different for shukko versus all other involuntary sepa-
rations.  In virtually all cases, the absolute magnitudes of the coeffi-
cients are smaller for workers undergoing shukko.  At the same time, as
suggested by the wage-change distributions in the previous subsection,
our estimate of unexplained wage-change variance, sigma, is also
much smaller for shukko workers (less than half the value for laid-off
workers among men).  Thus, both measured and unmeasured personal
and firm characteristics matter much less for wage changes among
shukko workers.  In part because the preseparation firm sometimes
pays the worker his or her old wage during the initial period at the new
firm, shukko workers thus seem to be relatively insulated from the het-
erogeneity in wage-change experiences of laid-off workers in Japan.
Third, focusing now on the “laid-off” workers columns, the wage
consequences of displacement vary considerably with workers’ charac-
teristics in Japan.  Compared with workers with less than high school
(the omitted group), workers with more education experience larger
wage losses in Japan, with the largest losses among those with junior
college degrees.  Firm size also matters: compared to workers remain-
ing in a small firm before and after displacement, men moving into a
large firm experience, on average, 3 percent larger wage gains, while
those leaving a large firm lose 5 percent more.  The large premium for
full-time work, of about 10 percent, is unsurprising given that our
monthly wage statistics will reflect hours variation between jobs.  Men
who change industry experience 4 percent larger wage losses (women,
2 percent), consistent with the existence of industry-specific capital
(Neal 1995).  Especially for men, industry-wage premiums are highly
important in explaining wage changes.  Moving into industries which
pay above-average wages raises an individual’s wages; leaving them
reduces wages.42  Finally, and again especially for men, older workers
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clearly lose more from displacement than younger workers.  To some
extent this surely reflects their higher tenure levels, which we are
unable to control for in Japan.  Especially for workers aged 55–64, it
may also reflect the significant amount of work in “secondary” labor
markets that occurs after mandatory retirement. 
In sum, most of the patterns in displaced workers’ wage changes in
Japan will be familiar to analysts of displacement in other countries.
The muted wage changes experienced by shukko workers are of dis-
tinct interest, however, as is the association of higher education with
greater wage losses.  The magnitudes of the effects of different vari-
ables may differ substantially from other countries, however—a ques-
tion we address in our analysis of Canadian data next.
Results from wage-change regressions for Canada are shown in
Table 3.20.  Just as for Japan, we present one set of results for all job
separations in columns 1 and 4 (though in Canada we require these
separations to be permanent).  The remaining columns restrict the sam-
ple to permanent layoffs only; of these, columns 2 and 5 provide the
fullest possible description of the pattern of wage changes in Canada;
columns 3 and 6 replicate the Japanese regressions essentially exactly
by dropping those covariates not available in the Japanese data (union
status and tenure).43  The dependent variable in all regressions is the
ratio of post- to preseparation hourly wages (based on wage levels
reported by the worker); multiplying Table 3.20 coefficients by 100
thus makes them roughly comparable with those for Japan (Tables 3.18
and 3.19). 
Table 3.20 shows the following.  First, unlike Japan, education is
essentially uncorrelated with wage changes among separating or dis-
placed workers.  Of course, higher education raises both pre- and post-
separation wages in Canada (regressions not shown), but the effects are
roughly equal.  Thus it would appear that wage premiums associated
with educational credentials are more likely to survive displacement in
Canada than in Japan.  Second, focusing on the comparable regressions
in columns 3 and 6, it is clear that firm size “matters” in Canada, as it
does in Japan.  Perhaps more unexpectedly, firm size appears to be
much more important in Canada than in Japan: displaced men who
move from a large firm to a small firm in Canada lose 24 percent more
in wages than those in small firms both before and after displacement.
This compares to only a 5 percent larger loss in Japan, where the larg-
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est firm-size category (1,000 or more workers) actually refers to much
larger firms than in Canada (500 or more).44  Despite frequent com-
ments about the importance of dual labor markets in Japan, we thus
find larger firm-size premiums in a North American economy—Can-
ada.  This may reflect greater overall wage heterogeneity, as well as
more idiosyncratic rent-sharing, as argued by Teulings and Hartog
(1998).45
In contrast to firm size, part-time status matters much less in Can-
ada than in Japan; in fact the only significant part-time coefficient
implies an hourly wage gain for women moving into part-time jobs.
As in Japan, older workers lose more from displacement, and the mag-
nitude of the age effect is similar.  As columns 2 and 5 indicate, con-
trolling for tenure reduces, but does not eliminate, these age effects,
suggesting that pure aging may play a role.  Visible minorities lose sig-
nificantly more from displacement than other Canadians.  Because
pure wage discrimination should affect both pre- and postdisplacement
wages equally, this suggests that there might be a search component to
discrimination—jobs in which visible minorities are welcome may be
relatively scarce, prompting them to accept low-wage jobs while
searching in this “thin” market. 
Finally, the Canadian data provide evidence on the effects of a
very important variable, aside from tenure, that is absent from the Jap-
anese data: union status.  Clearly, workers transiting from union to
nonunion status (“UN”) lose more from displacement, and workers
transiting into union status (“NU”) gain, by between 12 and 20 percent
in all cases.  While controlling for union status does not alter the other
regression coefficients much (it reduces the firm size effects a little but
to nowhere near the small Japanese levels), it would be interesting to
see whether similar union effects are present in Japan, where union
coverage rates are similar to Canada’s but where more mechanisms
exist by which union wage settlements might affect nonunion workers. 
In sum, a regression-based examination of the patterns in wage
losses experienced by displaced workers in Canada and Japan reveals
both commonalities and differences.  Commonalities include increas-
ing wage losses with age, and wage losses that are accentuated when
workers move out of large firms and into small ones.  Differences
revolve around the fact that some factors “matter” more for wage
changes in one country than the other, or do not matter at all in one of
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the two countries.  Firm size clearly matters more in Canada: in compa-
rable wage-change regressions, estimated firm-size premiums are
much larger there.  In contrast, education and part-time status matter
more in Japan.  Further investigation into what might explain these
wage-structure differences seems warranted.  Finally, it is worth recall-
ing the existence, in Japan but not in Canada, of a group of involun-
tarily displaced workers who experience no unemployment and whose
wage changes are much more muted than those of laid-off workers:
shukko workers.  For some, at least, shukko might be a “kinder, gen-
tler” alternative to displacement that permits industrial adjustment just
the same.
COMBINING INCIDENCE AND CONSEQUENCES: THE 
PREVALENCE OF SEVERE SEPARATION-INDUCED
WAGE LOSS
It would appear, based on the analysis so far, that—with the excep-
tion of older Japanese men exposed to early retirement risk—displace-
ment, in the sense of involuntary, permanent job loss, is less common
in Japan than Canada.  Furthermore, it appears that, with the same
exception, the likelihood of experiencing a large wage decline as a
result of displacement is less in Japan as well.  Overall, this would sug-
gest that a randomly selected Japanese worker has more lifetime earn-
ings security than a comparable Canadian worker.46  In this section we
quantify this difference between the two labor markets by computing a
simple, comparable, summary measure of wage security for each.  In
particular, we ask: “In any given year, what is the probability that a
randomly selected employed worker of a given age will experience a
permanent job separation which results in an hourly wage loss of more
than 30 percent?”  For want of a better term, we call this the “risk of
severe, turnover-induced, wage loss.” In addition to combining infor-
mation about both the incidence and consequences of displacement,
this indicator might be thought of as a measure of displacement rates
that is not dependent on potential differences in the labeling of separa-
tions across countries.  Rather than restricting attention to particular
separation reasons, we include all separations and, in a sense, weight
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their “severity” by the wage loss associated with them, thus circum-
venting these labeling and definitional issues.
Our estimates of per-worker frequencies of separation-induced
wage gains and losses are presented in Table 3.21.  The figures
reported there combine the information on wage changes used in the
previous section with the permanent separation rates calculated in
Table 3.5.  According to Table 3.21, men’s overall risk of severe, turn-
over-induced wage loss is under one percent (0.8 percent) per year in
Japan, and more than double that (1.9 percent) in Canada.  As
expected, this reflects both a higher male permanent separation rate
and a greater likelihood of experiencing a large wage loss conditional
on changing jobs in Canada.  For women, the incidence of severe sepa-
ration-induced wage loss is also greater in Canada than Japan, but the
difference is much more moderate.  This is because, as noted in Table
3.5, Japanese women actually have higher turnover rates than Cana-
dian women. 
Together, the age trends in Table 3.21 yield a perhaps-surprising
finding that reinforces some trends noted much earlier, in Table 3.5: If
job security is defined as freedom from the risk of a job change that
results in a wage loss of over 30 percent (or 10 percent for that matter),
older Canadian workers (55+, both men and women) have greater
earnings security than older Japanese workers. Loosely, after a turbu-
lent youth characterized by high turnover, both voluntary (“job shop-
ping”), and involuntary (layoffs, which tend to be ordered by inverse
seniority), Canadian workers tend to settle into permanent jobs where,
by age 55, they are at relatively low risk of large, separation-induced
wage losses.  Japanese workers, especially men, enjoy unparalleled
“wage security” when young, but face increasing wage-loss risk as
they age.  To some extent, then, older workers may bear a much larger
share of the adjustment burden in Japan than in Canada. 
A final question seems natural to ask: “Do younger Japanese work-
ers ‘pay’ for their very high level of job and wage security in any
way?”  According to columns 3, 4, 7, and 8 of Table 3.21, which
present parallel statistics on separation-induced wage gains, in at least
one very important sense, the answer to this question is “yes”: their
prospects of increasing their wages by finding a new, better job are
much lower.  While in both countries the chances of “moving up” by
switching jobs fall with age, the international differences are dramatic
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in all age categories.  In any given year, a 20- to 24-year-old employed
Canadian man has an 11.0 percent chance of raising his wage rate by
30 percent or more by switching employers.  The equivalent probabil-
ity in Japan is 1.3 percent.  Even in a man’s late 50s, the international
difference is more than tenfold—1.1 percent in Canada versus 0.1 per-
cent in Japan.  Similar but less dramatic differences are present for
women.
Thus, to some extent the greater protection from turnover-induced
wage loss experienced in Japan, especially by young and prime-age
men, is counterbalanced by the fact that fewer wage gains can be had
from turning over.  In general, this reflects the fact that the variance of
separation-induced wage changes is much higher in Canada than
Japan.  Despite Japan’s low level of unionization and enterprise-level
wage bargaining, these wage-change results are suggestive of a more
compressed overall wage distribution.  To the extent that workers are
risk averse, this lower variance can be thought of as raising the level of
“effective” wage security in Japan, again especially among young and
prime-age men.
EMERGING ISSUES: WHERE TO GO FROM HERE? 
In this chapter we have described the main institutional elements of
the Japanese and Canadian economies that affect displaced workers,
and we have presented evidence on the incidence and consequences of
displacement in both countries.  Our main results have already been
summarized in the introduction; in this concluding section we try to
summarize the main outstanding puzzles our work leaves unanswered
and provide suggestions for what needs to be done next to resolve
them.
Concerning overall separation and displacement rates in Canada
and Japan, a somewhat unexpected finding of this chapter is the rough
similarity in permanent separation rates between the two countries.
This phenomenon—reminiscent of Koike’s (1984, for example) “revi-
sionist” claim that Japanese employment systems do not necessarily
provide more security than “Western” ones—is obscured in some pub-
lished aggregate statistics by the inclusion of the large number of tem-
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porary separations in North American data, by a tendency to focus on
male workers only, and by the tendency of Japanese statistics  (because
they are often based on surveys of firms) to restrict attention to workers
in larger firms.  When these factors are adjusted for, overall permanent
separation rates in the two countries are similar, though they are higher
for men in Canada and women in Japan.  Clearly this finding needs to
be explored in more detail, with as many data sources as possible, and
with the closest attention to comparability of the data.  If it is supported
by further examination, it may have very important implications for
understanding the process of industrial adjustment in Japan, compared
to North American economies.  The finding also needs to be reconciled
with the very clear differences in age-specific mean job tenures we see
between Canada and Japan.  Tenure is much higher in Japan (at least
among men); this could be consistent with the turnover data if turnover
in Japan is more concentrated among low-tenure workers (for example,
part-time and contract workers) than in North American economies. 
A related puzzle concerns the very high fraction of Japanese sepa-
rations that are voluntary, compared to Canada.  Is this a genuine dif-
ference, or purely a labeling phenomenon?47 The fact that many fewer
Japanese separations result in large wage declines, plus the fact that in
the aggregate, worker and firm labeling of separations seems to agree
in Canada, certainly suggests that it is genuine.  However, it is also true
that many fewer separations result in substantial wage increases in
Japan, so the phenomenon seems to warrant further investigation.
Who are all these quitters in Japan? Are they concentrated in certain
industries or demographic groups?  Does the large fraction of volun-
tary turnover in Japan provide another mechanism for industrial adjust-
ment that is less important in North America?  Is the high fraction of
involuntary turnover in Canada a “labeling” response to its particular
employment insurance system? 
Another aspect of the composition of separations that deserves fur-
ther analysis is the much larger share of Japanese separations labeled
as due to the expiration of a fixed-term contract.  Despite recent con-
cern over the growth of this form of work in Canada and the United
States, it would appear to be much more prevalent in Japan.  Does the
much larger share of contract expirations in separations also substitute
for displacement of “regular” workers as a form of industrial adjust-
ment in Japan?
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A final, and fascinating, issue concerning displacement rates that
positively invites further exploration is the very different effect of age
on the frequency of displacement in the two countries.  In Canada, dis-
placement becomes much less common as a worker ages, while in
Japan the opposite occurs.  Importantly, this phenomenon involves
more than mandatory early retirement: it is clearly evident for simple
layoffs as well.  The Japanese and Canadian labor markets would thus
appear to function very differently over a worker’s lifetime: Canadian
workers enter the market with low job and wage security, but over time
accumulate greater security, in part due to a practice of layoffs by
inverse seniority.  In Japan, young workers, especially men, experience
a level of job security that may be unparalleled worldwide.  But this
security erodes as they age.  While each of these two systems may have
its merits, one might imagine that the Japanese system (loosely one of
layoffs by seniority rather than inverse seniority) might actually be bet-
ter at allowing organizations to continue renewing their workforce dur-
ing downturns in demand.  The organizational, productivity, and other
consequences of seniority-based, versus inverse-seniority-based, layoff
rules seem to strongly invite further comparative research. 
Turning now to the consequences of displacement, another very
striking finding of this chapter is the much longer unemployment dura-
tions of Canadian versus Japanese displaced workers.  To some extent
this should not be surprising because, at the time of our data, Canada’s
national unemployment rate was more than double Japan’s.  Still,
national unemployment rates are, to some extent at least, endogenous
outcomes of institutional differences, and understanding these effects
is particularly important from a policy perspective.  Do long “effec-
tive” notice periods, resulting from the significant procedural require-
ments for layoffs in Japan, help explain the short unemployment
durations there?  (To answer this question it would be useful to have
survey information on workers’ advance knowledge of a displacement
in Japan.)  What is the effect of the significant share of involuntary Jap-
anese separations that are due to the expiration of fixed-term contracts
on mean unemployment durations there? Are the long unemployment
spells in Canada related to its temporary layoff system, with its relative
absence of a “short, sharp, and irrevocable” break from the previous
employer?
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Emerging issues in the analysis of the wage consequences of dis-
placement are several.  One concerns the experiences of shukko work-
ers.  On the surface, shukko appears to be an attractive alternative to
“standard” layoffs when a firm needs to reduce its workforce, because
no unemployment is experienced and much less wage uncertainty is
involved: our data clearly show that wage changes are much more
muted for shukko than other displaced workers.  But are these changes
truly more muted?  The survey used here only captures workers within
a year of the separation while most shukko workers are likely still on
the original firm’s payroll.  In addition, some of these workers might
still be benefiting from a long list of government wage subsidies avail-
able to workers leaving declining industries, described in detail in this
chapter.  Longer-term studies of shukko workers would seem to be very
important, and might show much less benign wage effects of this prac-
tice.
Looking at wage changes among displaced workers not on shukko,
our most striking finding concerns the much larger variance in wage
changes experienced by Canadian displaced workers.  Further study of
this issue first needs to corroborate this very strong finding (which is
based on reported percentage wage changes in Japan) with data based
on reported levels of pre- and postdisplacement wages.  Assuming it is
genuine (which, given its magnitude, seems highly likely), further
research needs to ask what explains it.  Is it simply a result of a more
compressed overall wage distribution in Japan than in Canada, and if
so, which institutional features of the labor market explain this?
Unionization and minimum wages are not that different in the two
countries; perhaps greater Japanese uniformity in educational stan-
dards plays a role.  Another contributing factor might be a greater role
of postdisplacement “job shopping” in accounting for wage recovery
from displacement in Canada: Canadian workers might be more will-
ing, or able, to accept low-wage “stopgap” jobs after displacement than
Japanese workers, so the short-term variation in wage changes over-
states the long-term effects in Canada. 
Relatedly, the current chapter suggests that a more-detailed study
of the role of voluntary labor mobility in career wage growth may
reveal some fascinating differences in how Japanese and North Ameri-
can labor markets work.  Clearly, Canadian workers, especially when
they are young, can achieve very substantial wage increases by switch-
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ing firms.  This is much harder to do in Japan, but most studies also
indicate that the wage returns to staying with the same employer (i.e.,
the tenure-wage effect) are much higher in Japan than, say, the United
States.48  Thus, wages may grow at a similar rate with age in the two
types of economies, but via very different processes.  Relatedly, wage
inequality within a cohort of workers may increase much more with
age in Canada or the United States than in Japan, given the more varied
consequences of turnover for wages in the two systems.
Two other issues emerge from a regression analysis of wage
changes.  For one, firm-size wage effects, as estimated from displaced-
worker data, are (perhaps surprisingly) much larger in Canada than
Japan.49  This finding corroborates Teulings and Hartog’s (1998) claim
that “noncompetitive” wage differentials are actually larger in less-cor-
poratist economies, suggesting that labor allocation may not be more
efficient in those economies.  Our findings here do not include annual
bonuses, however, which are a large component of total compensation
in Japan.  It would be interesting to see whether the finding also holds
when bonuses are included, and to extend our displacement-based esti-
mates of firm-wage effects to other countries with different wage-set-
ting institutions.  The other aspect of wage changes that might warrant
further exploration is the strong, positive effect of education on dis-
placement-induced wage losses in Japan, but not in Canada.  Is there
any reason why educational credentials should be less portable across
firms in Japan than elsewhere?
Finally, while many strides have been made with the coming-of-
age of panel data sets outside the United States, an important remaining
obstacle to further research on displaced workers outside North Amer-
ica remains gaps in data.  As our investigation in this chapter clearly
shows, our understanding of displacement in Japan would be much
improved if the following information were available in microdata on
separating workers: job tenure, union coverage, and a finer disaggrega-
tion of workers by separation reason.  Job tenure and union coverage
have been shown to have very large effects on wage changes experi-
enced by displaced workers in Canada and elsewhere, and it would
reveal much about the structure of the Japanese labor market to see if
these same effects were present in Japan.  Japanese microdata currently
available do not allow us to distinguish separations due to “manage-
ment convenience” (the closest analogue to a pure “layoff” in North
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America) from mandatory retirements and expirations of fixed-term
contracts.  An analysis of just the first group might yield less benign
consequences of displacement than we currently find for Japan.
In sum, this chapter shows that much can be learned, and that much
remains to be learned, about the functioning of different national labor
markets by comparing the experiences of displaced workers among
countries.  We can only hope that this chapter, and this volume, will
stimulate more and more of this work.
Notes
NOTE:  We thank Garnett Picot and Leonard Landry of Statistics Canada for gener-
ously providing customized counts of separation and displacement rates in Canada.
1. For example, according to Hashimoto (1990, p. 50), the labor-force participation
rate among men over 65 was 35.8 percent in Japan, compared with only 16.7 per-
cent in the United States in 1988.  
2. Beginning in April 1998, firms were no longer permitted to impose mandatory
retirement below age 60.
3. See Nakamura and Vertinsky (1994) for a more detailed description of keiretsu
relationships.
4. Employment protection legislation has played a key role in the debate over the
causes of high European unemployment over the last decade (see Bertola 1992,
for example).
5. Another legal reason for the difficulty Japanese firms have in laying off workers
is that the standard employment contract for regular workers simply states that a
person is employed by a firm, meaning that workers will obey company orders to
work.  Because these contracts are not specific about the tasks workers are
expected to perform, firms are expected to assign workers to whatever tasks are
consistent with permanent employment.
6. A third set of restrictions concern discriminatory discharges, on such bases as
race, sex, and union activity.  Such restrictions are set out in provincial Labor
Relations Acts, Human Rights Acts, and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
See Arthurs, et al. (1993), pp. 88–95.
7. See, for example, Downey 1989.  
8. Each of the ten provinces and two territories have their own employment stan-
dards acts and industrial relations acts, though there are many similarities and a
good deal of borrowing and diffusion among jurisdictions.  Unlike the United
States, where federal statutes—such as minimum wage—supersede state laws, the
Canadian federal labor jurisdiction is limited to a small subset of industries
nationwide, including banks, transportation, communications, and the federal
public service.
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9. In most cases layoffs are classified as temporary, and hence not subject to notice
requirements if their expected duration is fewer than 13 weeks or (in cases of
mass layoffs) if the employer advises the Director of Employment Standards that
he or she expects to recall the workers within a period of time approved by the
Director.  Some jurisdictions require notice of all large-scale layoffs, however,
whether permanent or not.
10. Interestingly, a small number of Canadian jurisdictions require workers to notify
their employers of their intent to quit, though it is unclear whether this provision
has ever been enforced.
11. Other groups receiving special treatment in Japan’s EI system are older workers,
seasonal workers, and day laborers.  Workers who become unemployed after 65
years of age receive a lump-sum payment ranging from 50 to 150 days’ wages.
Eligible seasonal workers receive a lump sum which is typically equal to 50 times
the basic daily EI payment.  Eligible day laborers receive daily EI payments,
which are available for 13–17 days, depending on past earnings and the number of
days of contribution to EI.
12. The major element of the 1996 reform was a move from weeks to hours of work
to determine eligibility.  For example, where previously 12 to 20 weeks of work
were required to meet the entrance requirement, this was modified to 420 to 700
hours.  (Many adjustments, such as these, are straightforward conversions based
on a 35-hour week, which is very close to the average for Canadian workers.)  In
accord with the move to hours, coverage was extended to all hours of paid
employment in the economy, including those in part-time jobs.  In addition, a very
mild degree of experience rating was added to the system which, unlike the sys-
tem in the United States, had previously not been experience rated at all.  How-
ever, again unlike the United States, the experience rating is based on the
worker’s history of EI use and not the employer’s.  
13. The actual rate used in administering the system is a seasonally adjusted 3-month
moving average.
14. The rough comparability of Canada’s EI system with Japan’s does not extend to
the United States.  In 1993 the Canadian system paid Can$18.3 billion in benefits
to a labor force of about 14.5 million people, whereas the American system paid
about US$20.7 billion to a labor force of about 131 million.  Given an exchange
rate at that time of 1.30 (Can./U.S.), this implies that per-capita payments in Can-
ada were about 6 times larger than those in the United States.  
15. EM programs provide a kind of parallel system to the EI programs, but for work-
ers who are ineligible for EI.  Unlike the EI programs, which are financed by a
payroll tax, EM programs are financed mostly by general revenue.  One EM-law-
based employment maintenance program of potentially considerable significance
for displaced workers is the subsidy for promoting training of middle-aged and
older workers (Chuukonen rodosha to juko shoreikin).  Under this program, mid-
dle-aged and older workers (40 years or older) are eligible to get a 50 percent sub-
sidy for taking training and education courses for the purpose of preparing
themselves for new jobs after their retirement from their present jobs, up to a
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maximum of 100,000 yen.  For more information on EM-based employment
maintenance programs, see Japan Ministry of Labor (1997c).
16. Small and medium-size enterprises satisfy one of the following conditions: 1)
book-value capitalization does not exceed 10 million yen for firms in retail and
service sectors; 30 million yen for firms in the wholesale sector; or 100 million
yen in other sectors; or 2) the number of regularly employed workers does not
exceed 50 for firms in retail and service sectors; 100 in the wholesale sector; or
300 in other sectors.
17. See Glenson and Odaka (1976), Higuchi (1991, 1996) and Okochi, Karsh, and
Levine (1974) for a description of shunto, as well as other historical and institu-
tional aspects of the Japanese labor market.
18. It should be noted that Japanese bonuses are paid to all regular workers regardless
of their union status, including such nonmanagerial staff as security personnel,
school teachers, and government employees.  In this sense, unlike bonuses paid to
executives in North America, Japanese bonuses are used primarily as a means to
keep firms’ wage bills flexible over time while maintaining employment.
19. One difference, which in part explains the Canada-U.S. gap in unionization rates,
is that “certification votes” are not usually required to establish a union in Canada.
Rather, signatures are collected over an extended period.
20. In addition to these two mechanisms, nationwide minimum wages exist for two
industries: the metal mining industry (7,085 yen, effective March 30, 1997) and
non-metal mining industries (5,772 yen, effective May 17, 1989).   Minimum
wages can also result from mandatory extension of collective bargaining agree-
ments, although there are only two cases of this in all of Japan.
21. The “departures” sample does not contain information about the subsequent jobs
or unemployment experienced by the workers involved.
22. It is generally thought that employer compliance with this reporting requirement
is quite good, because, by submitting the form, the employer can cease remitting
payroll taxes on behalf of the worker.  One exception to this is for workers in jobs
involving under 15 hours per week, who during our sample period were exempt
from UI payroll taxes (and ineligible for UI benefits).
23. We also examined rates for 1988 in both countries and a number of intervening
years in Canada.  There are few differences and little evidence of a time trend, as
Picot, Lin, and Pyper (1997) have already noted for Canada.  It is perhaps worth
noting, however, that imposing the firm-size and job-length restrictions in the
Canadian data causes separation rates to drop quite precipitously: a large fraction
of Canadian separations (and perhaps Japanese ones as well—we have no way of
knowing for Japan) are from very short jobs in very small firms.  Finally, note that
in both the Japanese and Canadian data presented in Table 3.5 persons who sepa-
rate more than once a year will be counted as adding to the separation rate more
than once.  Given the restriction to jobs lasting one month or more, a single indi-
vidual could, potentially, contribute up to 11 separations per year to the counts in
both countries.
Worker Displacement in Japan and Canada 253
24. In other work, Kuhn (1999) has argued that ROEs substantially undercount sepa-
rations among teenage workers in Canada.  This is especially important before
1997, because a much larger fraction of teens than any other age group work part
time, and part-time workers were not subject to employment insurance premiums
until 1997.  Therefore, we shall largely ignore teens in our discussion of separa-
tion and displacement rates.
25. When work is very sparse, workers are sometimes told not to come in to work in
Japan.  Unlike in Canada, however, this would not be counted as a separation
because the worker is still considered to be employed by the firm.   
26. Recall that we are ignoring the numbers for teens in Canada, due to the likelihood
of a large undercount of their separations in our data.
27. Presumably workers whose contract ended are included in the “other” category in
Canada, though it is possible that some are coded in the “short work” category.
In the Canadian UI (now EI) system, the category “dismissed” is read as “dis-
missed for cause” and implies that the worker would not, after 1993, normally be
eligible for UI benefits.
28. For the purposes of this analysis, we further exclude multiple job holders who
separated from a job which is not their “main” job.
29. Because there is no specific category on the ROE form for “end of contract,”
these may include some workers whose limited-term contracts ended.  More
likely, however, contract terminations will be coded as “other.”  According to
Table 3.7, however, including these in our count of displacements would make
only a minor difference to Canadian displacement rates, because firms use the
“other” category for only 4.6 percent of male separations and 3.5 percent of
female separations (compared with “shortage of work” frequencies of 61.8 and
47.5 percent, respectively).
30. As pointed out in the previous footnote, adding contract terminations to the count
of Canadian displacements would increase the displacement rate only marginally.  
31. Retirements (voluntary or otherwise) are not included in our Canadian data.
Despite the fact that mandatory retirement remains legal in Canada (unlike in the
United States), it is our impression that the vast majority of retirements in Canada
are voluntary and thus should not properly be included in any count of displace-
ments.
32. Although it is possible that some workers would have been recalled beyond the
end of the survey, the final panel was approximately 57–63 weeks after the initial
separation so any subsequent recall would have been beyond the maximum possi-
ble duration of unemployment insurance benefits.  Also, although the survey
experienced about 20 percent attrition between the first and last panels, when the
same tabulations are performed on the subsample of those who responded to both,
the column and row percentages are remarkably similar to those for the entire
sample.
33. To investigate the possible influence of workers finding temporary jobs while
awaiting recall, we calculated the fraction of workers who obtained a first job and
were observed subsequently to return to their former employer.  In our data win-
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dow only about 0.8 percent of workers (from the set labeled as laid off by at least
one party) did this; so we do not believe it would have a large influence.
34. In this survey, unlike the published statistics in Table 3.6, “management conve-
nience” includes mandatory retirements and also job terminations of workers on
nonregular contracts such as casual and term contracts.  To the extent that these
workers’ unemployment durations are longer than layoffs of regular workers, our
estimates for Japan will overestimate durations among the latter group.
35. As the advance-notice literature (Jones and Kuhn 1995, for example) shows, a
substantial fraction of jobless durations will be exactly zero if workers receive,
and make use of, substantial prenotification periods.  This may be the case in
Japan, though our data do not distinguish workers with exactly zero joblessness
from others with under a month of joblessness.
36. Alternatively, we could have picked a single interview date and selected the sam-
ple based on labor-force attachment at that date.  This raises the issues of which
date to use, however, and how to treat individuals who exit from the survey
between dates.  Overall, we prefer the above “bracketing” approach because it is
simpler.  
37. It would, of course, be very interesting to dissaggregate these three forms of
involuntary terminations, but this is not possible in the microdata file provided by
the Ministry of Labor.  Note also that the microdata file of Japan’s Employment
Mobility Survey does not distinguish temporary and permanent shukko assign-
ments; thus our results should be interpreted as applying to a population-weighted
average of the two.
38. Workers experiencing wage losses of over 30 percent were assigned a value of –30;
those experiencing losses of 10 to 30 percent a value of –15.  A similar pattern was
followed for workers experiencing gains.  Workers experiencing wage changes of
–10 to +10 percent were assigned a value of zero.
39. The percentage change is calculated as 100 × (post – pre)/pre, where pre- and
post- refer to wages before and after separation.
40. The Canadian figures in Table 3.17 are based on our own calculations from the
1994 Survey of Labor and Income Dynamics (Statistics Canada 1997).  The
nature of the establishment size question in this survey does not allow us to dupli-
cate precisely the Japanese data’s restriction to workers in establishments of at
least 10 workers.  Therefore, to “bracket” the Japanese definition, we provide
results with no establishment-size restriction, and for workers in establishments of
20 or more persons.  Usually the latter generate higher mean tenures, but for the
specific case of men aged 50–54 the two measures happen to coincide exactly.   
41. Just as for the calculation of means in Table 3.14, workers experiencing wage
changes of  –30 to –10 percent are assigned a value of –15, and workers experi-
encing gains of 10 to 30 percent are assigned a value of +15.  Workers experienc-
ing changes of –10 percent to +10 percent are assigned a value of zero.
42. Industry wage premiums were calculated from aggregate statistics as the average
wage in the industry divided by the overall average wage.  Statistics refer to
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monthly regular wages (not including bonuses, overtime, and so forth) of workers
on regular contracts (not fixed-term or part-time).
43. We keep visible minority status in the Canadian regressions, however, despite the
absence of a Japanese counterpart.  This does not affect the results materially.   
44. In both Canadian and Japanese data sets, “firm” sizes actually refer to establish-
ments, not (necessarily) entire companies. 
45. Teulings and Hartog presented a wide array of evidence that corporatist countries
(those with centralized wage setting) have fewer “noncompetitive” wage differen-
tials, such as firm-size effects, than decentralized economies.  In the case of Japan
(p. 175) they found that its industry wages are less sensitive to output prices than
those in Canada and the United States.  They attribute this to informal bargaining
coordination.  Tachibanaki (1996) reported large firm-size wage premiums for
Japan, probably larger than the United States (though he makes no direct compar-
ison).  Our much smaller estimates are most likely explained by the fact that our
displacement-based measures implicitly control for individual fixed effects,
unlike Tachibanaki’s cross-section estimates.  That said, our estimated firm-size
wage premiums for Japan might be larger if bonuses were included in our wage
measure, as they are in Tachibanaki’s work. (Ito (1992, 234) presented simple
tabulations suggesting that bonuses are a larger fraction of compensation in large
than small Japanese firms.)
46. This greater level of security in Japan is also enhanced by the shorter unemploy-
ment durations there; because unemployment effects of displacement tend to be
temporary we do not incorporate these differences in our summary measure of
total earnings security here.
47. Hashimoto (1990, 77–81) argued that the quit-layoff distinction may be less
meaningful in Japan than in the United States or Canada.   
48. See, for example, Hashimoto and Raisian (1985, 1992), and Clark and Ogawa
(1992).  One limitation of these studies, however, is that they are all based on
cross-section data.  The limitations of using such data to estimate tenure-wage
profiles are well known (see, for example, Topel 1991); thus it would be of great
interest in future work to use Japanese panel data to estimate tenure effects, using
techniques similar to Topel’s.  
49. Existing estimates of Japanese firm-size wage premiums (Tachibanaki 1996, for
example) tend to be based on cross-section data only, and will therefore be con-
taminated by unobserved worker quality differences between firms.
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Table 3.1 Notice Requirements for Termination of Employment in 
Various Jurisdictions of Canada, 1997










Federal 3 months + 2 50+ 16
Alberta 3 mo. – <2 yr.
2 yr. – <4 yr.
4 yr. – <6 yr.
6 yr. – <8 yr.











3 mo. – <1 yr.
1 – <3 yr.
≥3 yr.
For each addit. year 
























10 or more, if 
they represent 














Nova Scotia 3 mo. – <2 yr.
2 – <5 yr.












Ontario 3 mo. – <1 yr.
1 – <3 yr.
3 – <4 yr.
4 – <5 yr.
5 – <6 yr.
6 – <7 yr.
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Quebec 3 mo. – <1 yr.
1 – <5 yr.












Saskatchewan ≥3 mo. – <1 yr.
1 – <3 yr.
3 – <5 yr.















90 d. – 3 yr.
For each addit. year 
of employment, 












Yukon 6 mo. – <1 yr.
1 – <3 yr.
3 – <4 yr.
4 – <5 yr.
5 – <6 yr.
6 – <7 yr.


















SOURCE: Human Resources Development Canada, Employment Standards Legisla-
tion in Canada; latest figures are available at: http://labor-travail.hrdc-drhc.gc.ca/
policy/leg/e/
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Table 3.2 Worker-Reported Advance Knowledge or Formal Notice of 
Permanent Layoff among Workers Experiencing Permanent 
Layoffs in Canada (%)
Duration of 
notice (wk.)
Advance knowledge Formal notice
Men Women Men Women
<1                                    37.90 43.97 32.83 29.20
1                                   23.41 26.18 27.36 26.76
2                                    18.26 12.28 20.57 19.22
3                                       7.17 4.71 9.81 11.19
4                                        2.68 1.61 3.40 3.89
5–8                              5.87 5.17 3.78 5.85
9–12                                   2.38 1.48 1.33 1.21
13–16                                  0.80 2.04 0.00 1.22
17+                                    1.50 2.49 0.95 1.46
Receiving
notice
63.36 60.47 35.52 44.01
NOTE: The durations presented are conditional on having received notice, or having
expected the layoff.  The sample for this table is workers who were labeled as a layoff
either by themselves or the firm and did not experience a recall in the survey window.
Columns may not total to 100% due to rounding error.  
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from the 1995 Canadian Out of Employment Panel
Survey. 
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Table 3.3 Employment Insurance Entitlements in Japan
A. EI payments as replacement ratios
Daily wage on last job ( ) Payment ratio (%)










B. Duration of maximum EI entitlements (days)
Full-time workers Part-time workers
Years insured 1–5 5–10 10–20 20+ 1–5 5–10 10–20 20+
Regular EI program
Age (yr.)
Under 30 90 90 180 n.a.a 90 90 180 n.a.
30–44 90 180 210 210 90 180 180 210
45–59 180 210 240 300 90 180 180 210






240 240 240 240 180 180 180
45–65 300 300 300 300 210 210 210
a n.a. = Not applicable.
b For disabled and other hard-to-employ workers.
SOURCE: Japan Ministry of Labor (1997c).
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(as % of mean wage) Definition, year
Japan 36 Weighted regional minimum wage (4,868  
per day) over mean contract wage for 
establishments with at least 10 employees, 
1995
Canada 38 Weighted jurisdictional averages over mean 
manufacturing wage, 1994
U.S.A. 38 Federal minimum over mean industrial wage 
(excl. agriculture and forestry), 1994
Germany 55 2,214 DM per day over mean manufacturing 
wage, 1993
France 84 36.98 F per hour over mean industrial wage 
(excl. agriculture and forestry), 1995
SOURCE: Japan Ministry of Labor (1997b).
¥
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Table 3.5 Annual Separation Rates for 1995
Canada






15–19 18.0 11.4 28.5
20–24 75.5 44.3 18.7
25–29 47.0 23.8 12.4
30–34 36.5 16.6 8.8
35–39 32.5 13.5 7.1
40–44 28.0 11.0 7.4
45–49 25.3 9.5 5.9
50–54 26.2 9.5 7.0
55–59 30.3 11.2 10.7
60+ 29.0 12.4 31.7
All ages 35.9 16.8 11.9
Women
15–19 16.6 11.1 20.7
20–24 66.9 42.3 24.9
25–29 45.0 21.9 26.4
30–34 35.6 14.5 19.4
35–39 30.7 12.0 15.2
40–44 25.3 9.0 12.6
45–49 24.8 8.5 10.9
50–54 24.1 8.1 11.9
55–59 27.6 9.6 13.7
60+ 28.8 12.9 25.0
All ages 34.1 15.7 18.3
(continued)
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Table 3.5 (continued)
Canada






15–19 17.3 11.3 24.7
20–24 71.4 43.3 21.7
25–29 46.1 23.0 17.7
30–34 36.1 15.6 12.0
35–39 31.7 12.8 9.8
40–44 26.7 10.1 9.4
45–49 25.1 9.0 7.9
50–54 25.3 8.9 8.8
55–59 29.2 10.5 11.8
60+ 28.9 12.6 29.5
Total 35.1 16.3 14.3
NOTE: In both countries, the separation rate is defined by the number of job separa-
tions during the year divided by the number of regularly employed workers on June
30.
SOURCE: For Japan, calculated from Ministry of Labor (1989) for 1988 and (1996)
for 1995.  For Canada, the numerator comes from special tabulations from Statistics
Canada, based on ROE files from Human Resources Development Canada.  The
denominator is from the June Labour Force Survey of the year in question.
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injury Total Marriage Childbirth
Nursing
care Totalb
Men 11.6 11.3 7.8 6.5 3.2 40.4 0.2 0 0.1 59.6
Women 8.6 6.0 3.0 3.5 1.6 22.7 8.7 5.5 1.0 77.4
Both 10.1 8.7 5.5 5.0 2.4 31.7 4.3 2.6 0.5 68.2
Age (yr.)
<19 11.7 1.0 0.0 8.7 0.9 22.3 1.0 0.3 0.0 77.7
20–24 4.8 3.3 0.0 5.8 0.8 14.7 8.0 2.3 0.2 85.3
25–29 4.6 5.1 0.0 4.9 0.5 15.1 12.5 8.5 0.4 84.9
30–34 5.2 6.3 0.0 6.1 0.8 18.4 4.8 6.0 0.3 81.5
35–39 6.3 11.1 0.0 7.5 1.0 25.9 1.1 3.0 0.4 74.0
40–44 9.8 14.0 0.0 4.5 2.5 30.8 0.2 0.2 1.3 69.5
45–49 12.0 17.0 0.1 5.3 4.1 38.5 0.1 0.2 1.7 61.5
50–54 11.5 15.6 0.4 4.2 6.9 38.6 0.1 0.0 0.5 61.3
55–59 18.6 19.7 10.2 4.9 5.6 59.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 40.9
60+ 23.6 8.8 34.2 1.4 4.8 72.8 0.0 n.a.c 0.8 27.1
a Management convenience in this table includes shukko assignments.
b Includes other voluntary reasons.
c n.a. = Not applicable.
SOURCE: Japan Ministry of Labor (1996).
264Table 3.7 Firm- and Self-Reported Reasons for Separation in Canada
Firm-reported     
reason
Self-reported reason












    4.73
61
 4.47
  17.13 
116
8.50








   6.01
  21.56
1,130
  72.30 
  16.11
27
   1.73
    7.58
182
 11.64 
   26.69 
1,563
 100.00 




     2.58
   12.77
136
   2.27
    31.19
5,331
  88.82 
    75.98
38
    0.63
   10.67 
342
      5.70
    50.15
6,002
  100.00 










   18.15
   0.76
214
   73.29
   60.11 
13
     4.45
   1.91
292
  100.00 
     3.01
Other 87
19.21
   7.17
167
   36.87
  38.30
158
   34.88
    2.25
16
     3.53
     4.49
25
    5.52
    3.67
453
 100.00 







   0.00





   0.00 
  0.00 
4
   13.33
  0.59 
30
  100.00 
   0.31
Total        1,214









     3.67
 100.00 
682
   7.03 
















    3.82
94
    6.87
 17.31
124










   22.86
1,506
  74.89
   29.49
41
  2.04










   2.35
  7.04
106
     2.83
   33.65
3,247
    86.79
  63.59
23
    0.61
   4.24
277
   7.40
   42.68
3,741
  100.00 








   0.95
41
   9.03
   0.80
381
 83.92 











   38.13
  33.65 
111
  39.93
    2.17
4
    1.44 
  0.74
12
   4.32 








   0.00
   0.00
6
  54.55
   0.12
0
    0.00
     0.00 
1
    9.09









    4.01
   100.00
5,106
   64.94
100.00
543
   6.91
   100.00 
649
    8.25 




NOTE: In vertical order, counts, row percentages, and column percentages are given respectively in each cell.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from the Canadian Out-of-Employment Panel (COEP) survey.  See Lacroix and Van Audenrode (2000)
for a more detailed description of the COEP data and methods.
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layoffs MCc MC + CFd  MC + CF + MRe
Men
15–19 2.4 0.4 n.d.f n.d.
20–24 12.3 0.8 n.d. n.d.
25–29 7.9 0.9 n.d. n.d.
30–34 6.3 0.8 n.d. n.d.
35–39 5.7 0.1 n.d. n.d.
40–44 5.0 1.6 n.d. n.d.
45–49 4.5 1.3 n.d. n.d.
50–54 4.5 1.5 n.d. n.d.
55–59 5.1 2.3 n.d. n.d.
60+ 4.7 2.8 n.d. n.d.
All ages 6.1 1.3 2.7 3.7
Women
15–19 1.6 0.1 n.d. n.d.
20–24 7.2 0.6 n.d. n.d.
25–29 4.6 0.8 n.d. n.d.
30–34 3.3 0.6 n.d. n.d.
35–39 3.1 1.3 n.d. n.d.
40–44 2.5 0.9 n.d. n.d.
45–49 2.4 1.4 n.d. n.d.
50–54 2.3 1.1 n.d. n.d.
55–59 2.5 2.3 n.d. n.d.
60+ 2.8 2.1 n.d. n.d.
All ages 3.4 1.1 2.7 3.2
Both
15–19 2.0 0.2 3.1 3.1
20–24 9.8 0.7 1.8 1.8
25–29 6.4 0.9 1.7 1.7
30–34 4.9 0.7 1.4 1.4
35–39 4.5 1.1 1.7 1.7
40–44 3.8 1.3 2.2 2.2





layoffs MCc MC + CFd  MC + CF + MRe
45–49 3.6 1.3 2.3 2.3
50–54 3.6 1.4 2.4 2.4
55–59 4.1 2.3 4.5 5.7
60+ 4.0 2.6 9.6 19.6
Total 4.9 1.2 2.7 3.5
NOTE: In both countries, displacement is defined by the number of job separations
during the year for specified reasons, divided by the number of regularly employed
workers on June 30.
a In Canada we restrict attention to permanent separations only.
b In Japan, “management convenience” includes shukko assignments.  We do not have
access to separation shares for “contract finished” and “mandatory retirement” in
Japan that are broken down by both age and gender. 
c MC = management convenience.
d CF = contract finished.
e MR = mandatory retirement.
f n.d. = No data available.
SOURCE:  For Japan, Ministry of Labor (1996) for 1995.  For Canada, the numerator
comes from special tabulations from Statistics Canada, based on ROE files from
Human Resources Development Canada.  The denominator is from the June Labour
Force Survey of the year in question.
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Men’s recall expectation Women’s recall expectation
No Yes Unsure Total No Yes Unsure Total
No 1,465 1,201 683 3,349 1,310 933 600 2,843
43.74 35.86 20.39 100.00 46.08 32.82 21.10 100.00
59.87 33.52 44.61 44.3 70.35 35.77 53.10 50.1
Yes 982 2,382 848 4,212 552 1,675 530 2,757
23.31 56.55 20.13 100.00 20.02 60.75 19.22 100.00
40.13 66.48 55.39 55.7 29.65 64.23 46.90 49.2
Total 2,447 3,583 1,531 7,561 1,862 2,608 1,130 5,600
32.2 47.4 20.3 100.00 33.3 46.5 20.2 100.00
NOTE: In vertical order, counts, row percentages, and column percentages are given
respectively in each cell.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from the Canadian Out-of-Employment Panel
(COEP) Survey.
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Table 3.10 Recall Expectations versus Realizations in Canada
Observed
returns      
Workers’ expectations             Firms’ expectations
No     Yes  Unsure   Total No     Yes   Total
Men
No         1,281     919     403    2,603 1,292    1,311    2,603
          49.21 35.31 15.48 100.00 49.64 50.36 100.00
          85.51 38.31 59.26 56.87 67.50 49.23 56.87
Yes         217    1,480     277    1,974 622 1,352 1,974
          10.99 74.97 14.03 100.00 31.51 68.49 100.00
          14.49 61.69 40.74 43.13 32.50 50.77 43.13
Total      1,498    2,399     680    4,577 1,914 2,663    4,577
          32.73 52.41 14.86 100.00 41.82 58.18 100.00
         100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Women
No          810     510     262    1,582 975     607    1,582
          51.20 32.24 16.56 100.00 61.63 38.37 100.00
          84.64 30.18 55.74 50.75 65.13 37.47 50.75
Yes         147    1,180     208    1,535 522    1,013    1,535
           9.58 76.87 13.55 100.00 34.01 65.99 100.00
          15.36 69.82 44.26 49.25 34.87 62.53 49.25
Total       957    1,690     470    3,117 1,497    1,620    3,117
          30.70 54.22 15.08 100.00 48.03 51.97 100.00
         100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
NOTE: In vertical order, counts, row percentages, and column percentages are given
respectively for each cell.  The sample is those who are observed to be reemployed.
The return to the predisplacement employer is not constrained to be the first job
obtained by the worker following the separation.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from the Canadian Out-of-Employment Panel
(COEP) survey.  
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Table 3.11 Kaplan-Meier Cumulative Reemployment Rates for 
Displaced Workers in Japan and Canada
NOTE: All columns present 1 minus the Kaplan-Meier survivor function for jobless
durations.  Medians are interpolated assuming a uniform distribution of durations
within the cell containing the median.
a Canada A drops individuals who were out of the labor force at all dates they were
interviewed after the separation.
b Canada B drops individuals who were out of the labor force at any date they were
interviewed.
c n.d. = No data available.
SOURCE: Japanese numbers calculated from a Special Supplement (1996, 1997) to
the Japanese Labor Force Survey (Japan Ministry of Labor 1996, 1997).  Our sample
includes separations due to the following reasons: layoffs, bankruptcy, declined busi-
ness and other company convenience reasons, where the latter include mandatory
retirements and expiration of fixed-term contracts.  The vast majority of workers
starting a shukko assignment would not be considered to be undergoing a termination
of employment and would thus not be included in this sample.  A small number of
“one-way” shukko workers might be so classified, however, and would thus appear in
our data.  Canadian numbers are calculated from the 1993 and 1995 COEP  surveys.
The Canadian sample refers to “permanent layoffs”: workers separating due to
“shortage of work” who do not return to the preseparation employer. 
Duration
(months)
Japan Canada Aa Canada Bb
Men Women Men Women Men Women
0–1 0.314 0.313 0.164 0.115 0.171 0.124
1–2 0.576 0.526 0.269 0.196 0.283 0.215
2–3 0.633 0.619 0.364 0.264 0.386 0.290
3–4 0.701 0.696 0.425 0.308 0.449 0.339
4–5 0.732 0.721 0.469 0.351 0.495 0.388
5–6 0.767 0.747 0.515 0.402 0.543 0.443
6–7 0.795 0.776 0.546 0.440 0.577 0.482
7–8 0.805 0.802 0.577 0.473 0.613 0.518
8–9 0.828 0.844 0.621 0.519 0.660 0.568
9–10 0.834 0.867 0.654 0.550 0.697 0.601
10–11 0.859 0.892 0.682 0.572 0.728 0.624
12 n.d.c n.d. 0.701 0.590 0.748 0.640
Median
(interpolated)
1.7 1.9 5.7 8.6 5.1 7.5
Sample size 778 634 3,756 2,682 3,271 2,243
Total
censored
243 192 1,208 1,138 932 858
Percent
censored
31.2 30.3 32.1 42.4 28.4 38.2
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Table 3.12 Cox Proportional Hazard Coefficients for Displaced 
Workers’ Jobless Durations in Japan 
NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses.  *** = Significant at the 1% level; * = signifi-
cant at the 10% level.
a IND4 = mining; IND5 = construction; IND7 = electricity, gas, water service; IND8 =
transportation; IND9 = wholesale and retail trade; IND10 = finance; IND11 = real
estate; IND12 = service; IND13 = government service; IND14 = “other.”
b YUKO is a published macroeconomic variable given the ratio of vacancies to job
seekers by age-gender group.
SOURCE: Calculated from a Special Supplement to the Japanese Labor Force Survey
(Japan Ministry of Labor).  Our sample includes separations due to the following rea-
sons: layoffs, bankruptcy, declined business, and other company convenience rea-
sons.
Variablea Men Women
Age –0.0080 (0.0197) –0.0389 (0.0269) 
(Age)2 –0.0001 (0.0002) 0.0003 (0.0003) 
Junior high 0.0797 (0.0928) –0.0190 (0.1093) 
Junior college 0.0567 (0.1461) –0.1209 (0.1128) 
University –0.0912 (0.1051) 0.0483 (0.2072) 
Single 0.0006 (0.0010) –0.0697 (0.1006) 
Small firm –0.0325 (0.0972) 0.0506 (0.1138) 
Large firm 0.0905 (0.1454) –0.2194 (0.1596) 
Part time  0.1624* (0.0986) 0.3083*** (0.0885) 
IND4 –1.6202 (1.0117) –0.1859 (1.0080) 
IND5 0.2094* (0.1213) –0.1811 (0.2132) 
IND7 –1.1779 (1.0098) –0.1264 (1.0142) 
IND8 0.3072 (0.1569) 0.2231 (0.2777)
IND9 –0.0296 (0.1133) –0.0046 (0.1233) 
IND10 0.1567 (0.3136) 0.5257* (0.2979) 
IND11 –0.0221 (0.3694) 0.1041 (0.4241) 
IND12 –0.1211 (0.1230) –0.0945 (0.1304) 
IND13 0.6815 (0.5948) –0.3231 (0.3162) 
IND14 –0.4828*** (0.1194) –0.4598*** (0.1337) 
YUKOb –0.1503 (0.1152) 0.0400 (0.1393) 
No. of obs. 778 634
N. of exiting 535 442
N. of censored 243 192
Log likelihood –4514.792 –3541.226
χ2 69.72927*** 64.35557***
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Table 3.13 Cox Proportional Hazard Coefficients for Displaced 
Workers’ Jobless Durations in Canada        
Men Women
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Men Women














































































Pseudo R2  0.011 0.012 0.009  0.013   0.013 0.01 
No.  of  obs.     2,988        2,988        2,988        2,191        2,191 2,191
NOTE:  Standard errors are in parentheses.  The dependent variable is the postdis-
placement non-employment duration. Sample used is the “Canada A” sample
described in Table 3.11.  *** = significant at the 1% level; ** = significant at the 5%
level; * = significant at the 10% level.
a Also included in the regression are 6 region dummy variables and 15 predisplacement
industry variables.
b Also included are the variables from note a, and the predisplacement wage.
c A dash (—) indicates that the variable was not included.
d Vismin = visible minority.
e Firm sizes are only in the 1995 data, so these variables should be interpreted as firm
size interacted with a dummy for the 1995 COEP. Size 1–19 is omitted.
SOURCE: Calculated by authors.
















All ages 5.44 28.48 47.74 12.25 6.09 2.2 53,175
<19 11.18 36.35 38.24 10.70 3.53 6.1 2,066
20–24 8.59 34.78 41.18 11.68 3.78 4.9 9,918
25–29 6.53 32.87 45.12 11.57 3.91 4.0 9,336
30–34 5.14 31.16 47.05 12.84 3.81 3.2 7,243
35–44 4.67 28.86 51.34 11.51 3.63 2.9 10,112
45–54 3.13 23.29 58.16 10.19 5.23 1.3 7,450
55–59 1.95 15.39 51.31 15.69 15.66 4.2 3,736
60–64 1.55 11.22 39.34 20.12 27.78 –9.2 2,585
65+ 1.51 13.31 59.40 13.17 12.62 –3.3 729
Involuntary separations,b
excluding shukko
All ages 2.82 17.62 44.35 18.75 16.46 –4.3 4,683
<19 9.70 26.87 44.03 14.18 5.22 3.2 134
20–24 6.75 30.11 42.70 14.42 6.02 2.6 548
25–29 3.55 25.72 50.33 15.74 4.66 1.2 451
30–34 3.23 21.89 51.49 18.41 4.98 0.0 402
35–44 3.68 22.49 55.78 13.85 4.19 1.1 787
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45–54 1.53 15.83 50.83 17.08 14.72 –4.1 720
55–59 0.91 8.85 36.33 25.39 28.52 –10.8 768
60–64 0.82 6.14 28.10 25.10 39.84 –14.6 733
65+ 0 11.43 42.86 17.14 28.57 –9.4 140
Shukko
All ages 0.71 5.58 87.79 4.25 1.67 –0.1 5,464
<19 1.92 9.62 82.69 5.77 0 1.2 52
20–24 0.60 6.55 87.50 4.17 1.19 0.2 336
25–29 2.27 7.85 83.42 2.79 3.66 0.3 573
30–34 1.22 7.15 85.69 4.72 1.22 0.4 657
35–44 0.27 6.65 89.17 3.02 0.89 0.4 1,459
45–54 0.45 3.85 90.90 4.19 0.61 –0.1 1,792
55–59 0.55 2.58 85.64 6.45 4.79 –1.9 543
60–64 0 12.5 47.92 25.00 14.58 –6.2 48


















All ages 5.32 27.87 47.91 13.58 5.32 2.2 34,886
<19 5.48 35.62 45.37 10.89 2.64 4.6 1,589
20–24 4.52 27.55 46.73 16.21 4.98 1.6 9,702
25–29 4.78 25.23 43.65 17.36 8.98 –0.1 5,478
30–34 6.89 29.15 44.46 13.31 6.19 2.6 3,005
35–44 7.52 30.63 47.20 10.77 3.88 4.1 7,782
45–54 4.23 26.61 53.47 11.80 3.89 2.3 5,035
55–59 2.87 24.05 58.72 9.19 5.17 1.5 1393
60–64 2.79 19.35 59.24 9.24 9.38 –0.5 682
65+ 2.27 16.36 65.45 7.27 8.64 –0.6 220
Involuntary separations,b excluding shukko
All ages 3.00 21.34 55.73 14.79 5.14 0.3 3,131
<19 5.59 24.48 54.55 12.59 2.80 2.6 143
20–24 3.21 24.78 52.62 16.18 3.21 1.3 686
25–29 3.27 17.44 51.50 20.16 7.63 –1.7 367
30–34 3.27 22.86 55.10 10.20 8.57 0.3 2,760
35–44 4.27 23.61 54.62 14.08 3.41 1.7 703
45–54 1.34 15.63 64.71 14.45 3.87 –0.6 595
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55–59 1.70 24.68 54.89 13.19 5.53 0.6 235
60–64 0.79 17.46 51.59 11.90 18.25 –4.4 126
65+ 3.23 12.90 61.29 12.90 9.68 –1.9 31
Shukko
All ages 2.61 9.26 81.00 5.46 1.66 0.9 421
<19 0.00 0.00 90.91 9.09 0.00 –1.4 11
20–24 0.00 6.36 90.00 3.64 0.00 0.4 110
25–29 5.00 6.25 81.25 6.25 1.25 1.1 80
30–34 9.30 9.30 74.42 6.98 0.00 3.1 43
35–44 0.00 12.50 77.5o 7.50 2.50 0.0 80
45–54 1.56 12.50 81.25 3.13 1.56 1.4 64
55–59 7.41 14.81 66.67 3.70 7.41 1.7 27
60–64 —c — — — — — —
65+ — — — — — — —
NOTE: Wage changes refer to monthly wages which do not include bonuses.   Involuntary separations
consist of mandatory retirement, company convenience, contract termination, and shukko.
a Estimated mean assigns valules 30%, 15%, 0, –15%, and –30% to each of the five-wage categories.
b Involuntary separations consist of mandatory retirement, company, convenience, contract termination,
and shukko.
c Cell sizes too small to report.
SOURCE: Japan Ministry of Labor (1997).




10% – 30% 
gain
10% loss – 
10% gain










All ages 19.46 15.86 34.50 16.47 13.70 1.6 5.9 3,278
15–19 27.88 22.42 21.82 17.58 10.30 6.0 17.9 165
20–29 24.85 17.51 28.95 16.65 12.04 4.0 9.0 1,171
30–39 17.20 16.13 35.97 16.03 14.66 0.8 2.1 1,023
40–49 15.21 12.94 38.51 17.64 15.70 –0.9 1.9 618
50–59  9.41 10.98 51.37 13.33 14.90 –2.0 –9.2 255
60 + 15.22 10.87 41.30 19.57 13.04 –0.7 6.0 46
Permanent layoffs
All ages 17.03 14.66 36.99 16.82 14.50 0.4 –0.4 2,455
15–19 18.07 25.30 21.69 22.89 12.05 2.2 3.3 83
20–29 22.52 16.09 31.02 16.60 13.77 2.5 3.6 777
30–39 16.00 14.41 38.34 16.73 14.53 0.1 –0.6 819
40–49 13.98 13.01 39.81 17.28 15.92 –1.2 –3.1 515
50–59 9.05 10.86 51.13 14.48 14.48 –2.2 –3.3 221
60 + 12.50 12.50 42.50 17.50 15.00 –1.5 –3.0 40
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a “Actual” mean is the percentage difference between mean pre- and postseparation wages in each age-gender category.
b Estimated mean assigns values 30%, 15%, 0, –15%, and –30% to each of the five wage change categories.  “Actual” mean is the per-
centage difference between mean pre- and postseparation wages in each age-gender category. 
SOURCE: Derived from the merged 1993 and 1995 COEP surveys.
Women
All separations
All ages 19.13 16.32 30.00 18.97 15.58 0.7 2.8 2,420
15–19 27.45 19.61 27.45 16.67 8.82 6.0 14.2 102
20–29 21.86 16.99 28.20 18.57 14.38 2.0 6.0 883
30–39 17.45 16.01 30.97 18.90 16.67 –0.2 –0.8 762
40–49 16.25 15.83 28.96 22.08 16.88 –1.1 –2.5 480
50–59 16.76 13.29 37.57 14.45 17.92 –0.5 0.5 173
60 + 10.00 20.00 45.00 15.00 10.00 0.8 –3.3   20
Permanent layoffs
All ages 18.38 14.26 31.50 19.39 16.48 –0.2 –2.4 1,578
15–19 26.83 12.20 34.15 14.63 12.20 4.0 4.7 41
20–29 20.91 15.38 29.59 18.54 15.58 1.1 –1.0 507
30–39 17.86 13.79 32.04 20.00 16.31 –0.5 –1.9 515
40–49 15.60 14.76 29.81 22.01 17.83 –1.8 –3.9 359
50–59 16.67 10.14 38.41 15.94 18.84 –1.5 –5.4 138
60 + 11.11 22.22 44.44 11.11 11.11 1.7 1.4 18
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Table 3.16 Mean Wage Changes by Tenure for Permanently Laid-Off 
Workers in Canada
Table 3.17 Mean Tenure by Age and Gender for All Employed Workers 
in Japan and Canada
Group All <1 1–3 3–5 6–10 >10
 Men
Change (%) –1.34 2.61 –0.31 –5.48 –5.13 –11.05
N 2,497 1,382 382 223 187 323
Women
Change (%) –2.42 0.81 0.79 –7.84 –4.35 –6.59
N 1,610 853 336 177 129 115
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from 1994 Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics.
Japan Canada Aa Canada Bb
Age (yr.) Men Women Men Women Men Women
All 12.9 7.9 9.0 6.7 9.6 7.9
<17 1.1 1.2 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
18–19 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.8 1.0 0.9
20–24 2.7 2.7 1.8 1.6 2.1 1.6
25–29 5.1 5.2 3.1 3.4 3.1 3.6
30–34 8.5 7.7 5.5 5.2 6.3 6.1
35–39 11.9 9.3 7.8 6.3 8.4 7.4
40–44 15.8 10.5 10.8 8.6 12.4 10.0
45–49 19.3 11.2 13.0 8.8 14.4 9.7
50–54 22.1 13.0 14.7 11.7 14.7 13.1
55–59 21.8 14.4 17.8 12.7 18.3 15.4
60–64 13.4 13.3 18.2 15.6 16.1 15.1
65+ 12.8 16.1 21.0 14.5 24.1 15.0
NOTE: The sample consists of employees at establishments with 10 or more workers
in June 1995.  Figures are for the individual’s “main” job, defined as the one with the
highest annual hours in 1994.
a Specification A imposes no establishment-size restriction.
b Specification B restricts to establishments with at least 20 employees.
SOURCE: For Japanese data, Japan Ministry of Labor, Survey of the Wage Structure
(1996).  For Canadian data, authors’ calculations from the Survey of Labour and
Income Dynamics for 1994.
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Table 3.18 Determinants of Wage Changes for Male Workers Who Found Jobs within One Year in Japan













































































































































— — — —
Laid off –5.399***
(0.232)













































































Log likelihood –197583 –16607.1 –16630 –17874.5 –17882.4
No. of obs. 52,414 4,603 4,603 5,443 5,443
NOTE: Double-truncated censored regression results by job-loss status.  Numbers in parentheses are asymptotic standard
errors.  *** = Significant at the 1% level; ** = significant at the 5% level; * = significant at the 10% level, all based on
asymptotic t-ratios.
a Laid-off workers category includes all involuntary separations excluding shukko: management convenience, contract ter-
mination, and mandatory retirement.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.

























































































































— — -— —
SHUKKO2 (back) –3.286***
(1.070)
— — — —
Laid off –1.736**
(0.265)

























































































Log likelihood –130038 –11,639.7 –11,640.6 –1,448.45 –1,448.6
No. of obs. 34,551 3,109 3,109 417 417
NOTE: Double-truncated censored regression results by job-loss status.  Numbers in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors. 
*** = Significant at the 1% level; ** = significant at the 5% level; * = significant at the 10% level, all based on asymptotic t-ratios.




Table  3.20 Determinants of Wage Changes for Permanent Separations and Laid-Off Workers Who Found Jobs within 
One Year  in Canada
Men Women
All separations Displaced workers All separations Displaced workers
Variable (1) (2)a (3)b (4) (5)a (6)b









UNd            –0.136***   
 (0.024)
–0.164*** 
   (0.028)






































Some post         –0.024 
















































All separations Displaced workers All separations Displaced workers
Variable (1) (2)a (3)b (4) (5)a (6)b






































































































































































Intercept          0.173***
 (0.029)










Industry       Yes         Yes         No          Yes         Yes          No
Province       Yes         Yes         No          Yes         Yes         No
R2          0.096       0.094       0.013       0.073        0.08       0.015
Nh              2,697        1,995        1,995        2,027        1,289        1,289   
NOTE: Ordinary least squares regression results (heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in parentheses).  The dependent variable is
the ratio of pre- to postdisplacement wages.  *** = Significant at the 1% level; ** = significant at the 5% level; * = significant at the 10%
level.
a Restricted to permanent layoffs.  Equations 1, 2, 4, and 5 include 15 predisplacement industry dummy variables.
b Restricted to permanent layoffs.  Equations include 15 predisplacement industry variables but drop union status and tenure.
c UU = union to union.
d UN = union to nonunion.
e NU = nonunion to union.
f Firm sizes are only in the 1995 data, so the variables should be interpreted as firm size interacted with a dummy for the 1995 COEP.
g Tenure is measured in years.
h The number of observations in each regression reflects the number of respondents who answered all of the relevant questions.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Men
15–19 1.1 3.1 5.1 3.0 0.4 1.7 8.7 1.3
20–24 4.7 11.0 18.8 11.0 0.8 2.5 8.0 1.3
25–29 2.6 6.0 8.3 4.7 0.5 2.2 4.9 1.2
30–34 1.9 4.1 4.6 2.5 0.4 1.5 3.3 0.5
35–39 1.7 3.4 3.8 1.9 0.2 1.0 2.0 0.2
40-44 1.2 2.9 2.6 1.4 0.4 1.3 1.9 0.1
45–49 1.3 2.5 2.3 1.3 0.4 0.8 1.6 0.2
50–54 1.2 2.3 1.7 0.7 0.6 1.2 2.0 0.3
55–59 1.1 2.3 2.1 1.1 1.5 2.9 1.5 0.1
60+ 1.0 2.4 3.1 1.9 6.8 10.5 4.1 0.2
All ages 1.9 4.2 5.1 2.8 0.8 2.1 3.8 0.6
Women
15–19 0.9 2.7 4.7 2.7 0.8 2.6 8.0 1.8
20–24 4.9 12.0 15.9 8.7 2.0 6.5 8.4 2.6
25–29 2.5 5.7 7.0 3.8 2.3 7.9 6.6 2.2
30–34 1.7 4.0 4.3 2.1 2.0 5.2 6.5 2.3
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35–39 1.5 3.3 3.4 1.7 0.6 3.1 4.0 1.0
40–44 1.1 2.4 2.5 1.3 0.5 2.3 4.9 0.8
45–49 1.1 2.5 1.9 0.8 0.5 1.8 3.4 0.7
50–54 1.0 2.0 2.2 0.8 1.4 3.8 3.3 0.3
55–59 1.1 1.8 1.8 1.0 1.0 2.4 3.9 0.7
60+ 1.2 2.6 3.2 1.3 2.8 4.8 3.0 0.0
All ages 1.9 4.2 4.8 2.4 1.4 4.4 5.6 1.4
Both
15–19 1.1 2.9 4.9 2.9 0.6 2.1 8.3 1.5
20–24 4.6 11.4 17.5 10.0 1.3 4.2 8.3 1.9
25–29 2.5 5.8 7.8 4.3 1.1 4.1 5.8 1.6
30–34 1.8 4.0 4.5 2.3 0.8 2.5 4.3 0.9
35–39 1.6 3.4 3.6 1.8 0.3 1.7 2.6 0.4
40–44 1.1 2.7 2.6 1.4 0.4 1.7 3.0 0.4
45–49 1.3 2.5 2.1 1.0 0.5 1.2 2.3 0.4
50–54 1.1 2.2 2.0 0.8 0.9 2.0 2.5 0.4
55–59 1.1 2.1 2.0 1.0 1.4 2.9 2.1 0.3
60+ 1.0 2.4 3.2 1.7 5.7 8.9 3.8 0.2
All ages 1.8 4.2 5.0 2.6 1.0 2.9 4.5 0.9
NOTE: All data refer to 1995, except the Canadian wage-loss distributions which are from the merged 1993 and 1995 COEP surveys.
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Appendix
Japanese Industries Eligible for Employment 
Maintenance and Adjustment Subsidies
SPECIAL EMPLOYMENT ADJUSTMENT INDUSTRIES
As of January 29, 1998, there were 72 special employment adjustment in-
dustries in Japan.  Together these industries included 86,954 establishments
employing 723,022 workers.  They are listed below.
As an example of how such industries become designated, consider the
most recent.  On January 29, 1998, the Ministry of Labor designated part of in-
dustry 2969, in particular the manufacturing of stone cutting machines, as a
special employment adjustment industry.  The stated reason for this designa-
tion was a decline in output due to increased imports of cheap tombstones and
other stone products from China and South Korea; the period of designation
(which can be extended) was February 1, 1998 to January 31, 2000.  This in-
dustry has 12 establishments and 187 workers.
294 Abe, Higuchi, Kuhn, Nakamura, and Sweetman
Table 3.A1 Special Employment Adjustment Industries
Industry Description Effective period
2969 (part) Stone cutting machines 1998.2.1~2000.1.31
1465 (part) Coloring process of Yuzen silk cloth 1998.2.1~2000.1.31*
1226 (part) Manufacturing frozen seafood (herring, 
salmon, cod, . . .)
1996.7.1~1999.6.30*
1229 (part) Preprocessing of herrings 1996.7.1~1999.6.30*
1362, 1363 Manufacturing fish powder 1998.7.1~1999.6.30* 
1423 Wool textile manufacturing 1996.7.1~1999.6.30* 
1425 (part) Flax textiles (excl. jute) 1995.8.1~1999.7.31*
143 Throwing (silk) manufacturing 1996.4.1~1999.3.31
1441 Cotton, synthetic textiles 1996.9.1~1999.8.31* 
1442 (part) Silk textiles 1996.9.1~1999.8.31*
146 (part) Textile coloring process (excl. 
manual coloring, lace coloring and 
textile, piecemeal coloring 
processes)
1996.8.1~1999.7.31*
1465 (part) Manual textile coloring (excl. 
coloring of Yuzen, scarfs, and 
handkerchiefs)
1996.7.1~1999.6.30*
1472, 1479 Fish net and other net production 
(incl. repair)
1996.9.1~1999.8.31
1481 Embroidery lace manufacturing 1997.11.1~1998.10.31
1484 Cloth string manufacturing 1996.4.1~1998.3.31
1485 Thin width textile products 1996.4.1~1998.3.31
1491 Hair processing 1996.4.1~1998.3.31
151 Production of overcoats and shirts 
(excl. traditional Japanese types)
1996.4.1~1998.3.31





Leather clothing and products 
manufacturing and wholesale
1995.7.1~1999.6.30*
1564 Socks manufacturing 1995.7.1~1999.6.30*
1595 Towel manufacturing 1997.1.1~1998.12.31
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Industry Description Effective period
1622 (part) Wood sheets manufacturing (excl. 
bamboo plated and decorative 
sheets)
1995.9.1~1999.8.31
1633 Wooden box manufacturing (excl. 
lunch boxes)
1995.7.1~1999.6.30
1811 Chemical pulp production 1997.10.1~1999.9.30
1852 Paper bags with square bottoms 1996.12.1~1998.11.30
1899 (part) Cloth paper pipes 1995.7.1~1999.6.30*
2297 (part) Flat yarn 1995.7.1~1999.6.30*
2312 bicycle tires and tire tubes 1995.7.1~1999.6.30*
232 rubber and plastic sandals 1995.7.1~1999.6.30*
2391 Cloth with rubber back and related 
products
1995.11.1~1999.10.31*
2393 Rubber material 1996.9.1~1998.8.31
2395 Recycled rubber manufacturing 1995.8.1~1999.7.31
extended
241 Tanned leather production 1995.7.1~1999.6.30*
244 Leather shoes and sandals 1995.7.1~1999.6.30*
2461,
2472 (part)
Bags and briefcases 1995.7.1~1999.6.30*
248 Fur manufacturing 1995.7.1~1999.6.30*
2514 Glass ware 1997.1.1~1998.12.31
2523 (part) Steel framed concrete pipes 1996.4.1~1998.3.31
2529 (part) Cement sheets 1995.7.1~1999.6.30*
2542,
2547 (part)
Kitchen pottery products 1995.12.1~1999.11.30*
2543,
2547(part)
Pottery decorative products 1995.12.1~1999.11.30*
2551 Fire resistant bricks 1995.10.1~1999.9.30*
2583 (part) Stone products for buildings 1996.4.1~1998.3.31
2584 (part) Insulation plats (excl. wall 
material)
1995.8.1~1999.7.31*
2595 Asbestos products 1995.8.1~1999.7.31*
2645 Iron processing 1995.10.1~1999.9.30*
(continued)
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Table 3.A1 (continued)
Industry Description Effective period
2662 Die production 1995.7.1~1999.6.30*
2811 (part) Production of cans 1995.7.1~1999.6.30*
2821 Western kitchen silverware 1995.7.1~1999.6.30*
2824 Tools (excl. grinding metals) 1996.6.1~1998.5.31
2831 (part) Steel connecting pipes (excl. die 
pipes)
1995.7.1~1999.6.30*
2842 (part) Metal window frames and doors 1996.5.1~1998.4.30
2851 (part) Aluminum, aluminum kitchenware 1996.6.1~1998.5.31
2892 Metal spring 1996.5.1~1998.4.30
295 (part) Textile mills production (excl. 
sewing machines)
1996.9.1~1998.8.31
2981 (part) Typewriter production 1996.4.1~1998.3.31
3012 Transformer production (excl. 
those for electronic equipment) 
1995.11.1~1999.10.31






Motion picture machinery, parts 1996.4.1~1998.3.31
332 Gun production 1996.10.1~1998.9.30
3432 (part) Cloth dolls production 1995.8.1~1999.7.31*
3434 (part) Baseball gloves, mitts 1995.7.1~1999.6.30*
3434 (part) Ski equipment 1995.12.1~1999.11.30*
3434 (part) Air guns, hunting rifles 1996.6.1~1998.5.31
3453 Button production 1996.10.1~1998.9.30
3454 (part) Needle production 1995.12.1~1999.11.30*
3475 (part) Umbrellas, parts 1995.7.1~1999.6.30*
3476 Matches 1997.7.1~1999.6.30
3911 (part) Railway (freight only) 1997.3.1~1999.2.28
459 (part) Volume measurement industry 1996.6.1~1998.5.31
*The effective periods for these industries have been extended.
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The following is the list of employment adjustment subsidy industries as
of January 29, 1998.a
Table 3.A2 Employment Adjustment Subsidy Industries 
Industry Description (effective region) Effective period
1299(part) Kaiware daikon salad leaf sprouts 
(all)
1996.10.18~1998.9.30*
1465(part) Scarf and handkerchief coloring 
(all)
1996.11.1~1998.10.31*
1532,1534 Knit underwear and pajamas (all) 1997.12.1~1998.11.30
1611 General lumber mills (all) 1997.10.1~1998.9.30
1622 (part) Wood sheets (all) 1997.11.1~1998.10.31
1711 Wood furniture, excl. lacquer 
painted (all)
1998.2.1~1999.1.31
2242 (part) Synthetic foam (Komatsu, etc.) 1997.4.1~1998.3.31
2513 (part) Glass light bulbs (all) 1997.4.1~1998.3.31
2523 (part) Concrete pile 1998.2.1~1999.1.31
2544 Electrical pottery insulation material 
(all)
1996.10.1~1998.9.30*
2546 Pottery tiles (all) 1997.7.1~1998.6.30
2549 (part) Pottery plant pots (all) 1998.2.1~1999.1.31
2644 Steel pipes (all) 1997.7.1~1998.6.30
2663 Die production 1997.11.1~1998.10.31
2864 Electric gilding (all) 1996.6.1~1998.5.31*




*The effective periods for these industries were extended. 
a As of June 1, 1998 this list grew: a total of 51 industries with 511,921  establishments
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